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ABSTRACT 
 
This work deals with the potential impacts of contract review on foreign direct investments in 
mining resources. The research has cited Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of Congo as the 
case study because the two countries have experienced the problems generated from mining 
contracts review programmes. Indeed, there are some variations on the nature of the 
environments in which the reviews were made. While in the DRC the reviews were done amid 
civil wars (whose root cause was wealth emanating from mineral resources), in Tanzania the 
reviews were done without such pressure. However, the situation seems to have not been fully 
solved neither in Tanzania where the reviews were done under “peaceful” environment nor in the 
DRC where at least the past experience could have taught them a lesson. 
 
The mini thesis is divided into four chapters each covering a distinct topic for discussion. 
Chapter one serves as an introduction highlighting on the mission and vision of the research. It 
also spotlights the scope and limitation of the research. Chapter two is a discussion on the mining 
sector and foreign direct investments in Tanzania and the concept of mining contracts review 
based on the Bomani Commission report. In fact this chapter together with chapter three are the 
core of the research. In chapter two facts are laid bare of how the mining operations are done in 
Tanzania and how the management is undertaken. While in the subsequent chapter to wit chapter 
three, the same is observed but now targeting the Democratic Republic of Congo.  The 
researcher has used these two chapters to demonstrate how inefficient the African governments 
are in running and maintaining the mineral resources by which they are endowed plentifully.   
 
 
 
 
 
 viii 
 
Chapter four is also formal in the sense that the researcher provides his point of view on how 
matters could be rectified. It is a firm view of the researcher that if the governments take heed to 
what is recommended, there will much improvements in the mining sector which can be 
recorded in shorter span of production.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
Tanzania is endowed with huge mineral deposits. She is the world’s third largest 
producer of gold after South Africa and Ghana.1 From the year 2000, the Tanzanian 
Government has conducted studies to formulate policies and strategies that will be used 
to economically empower Tanzanians so that they own, run and benefit from their 
economy. At this juncture, the National Economic Empowerment Policy and National 
Economic Empowerment Act have been in place since 2004. In order to operationalize 
this Policy, various programs and initiatives have been underway to enhance facilitation 
of economic actors in the country.2 Huge investments have been made in various areas 
which are potential for minerals, particularly gold.3  
However, the huge profit from these investments in the mining sector is not reflected in 
national development projects that could have tangible effects on the living conditions of 
the average Tanzanians. There have been public outcries that mining investments in 
Tanzania cause more problems than it was anticipated.4 A lot of wealth is taken  from 
                                                            
1 Kabelwa George, ‘Potential Impacts of FDI on Economic Development in Tanzania’, A paper prepared for a 
Policy Dialogue for Accelerating Growth and Poverty Reduction in Tanzania, held at the Conference Hall, ESRF, on 
25th May 2006. Available at www.tanzaniagateway.org/docs, (accessed on 18 September 2010). 
2 Eliseta Isaac Kwayu, the Executive Secretary of the National Economic Empowerment Council, Ministry of 
Planning, Economy and Empowerment: Empowerment of Economic Actors in Tanzania. A Paper Presented at a 
Policy Dialogue Seminar Organized by ESRF 7th September, 2006. 
3  Ministry of Energy and Minerals. The Mineral Policy of Tanzania. Oct. 1997. Available at 
http://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:6JtaH_Ea7Yg. (accessed on  24th Dec. 2011) 
4 Brief on the mineral sector in Tanzania. Available at www.mem.go.tz (accessed on 20 September 2010). 
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Tanzania to  other countries from which the mining companies originate and the 
Tanzanian wealth benefit those countries.5 
It is worth noting that mining contracts have been condemned to be the major reasons for 
depriving Tanzanians of their  wealth obtained from mining activities.6 
Mwalimu Julius Nyerere7 had a great concern for natural resources when he said: 
‘... (We) will do everything in our power to make sure that our children’s grandchildren 
will be able to enjoy this rich and precious inheritance.’8 He further stressed that  by 
saying: ‘We will leave our mineral wealth in the ground until when we  have  our own 
geologists and mining engineers.’9 His concern was to have the proper share in our  
resources, bearing in mind that Tanzania is the sole producer of some precious gemstones 
in the world like Tanzanite. Minerals like Tanzanite were named after their discovery in 
Arusha, Tanzania, and the country should think critically before granting licences to the 
big mining companies.  This has resulted in the current review of mining contracts.10 
Nyerere’s speech turned the spotlight on  the irregularities that could have happened in 
the allocation of contracts, and forcing the Tanzanian government  to consider the review 
of all the mining contracts. What was implied in Nyerere’s  speech is that he himself 
could  not have allowed these irregularities to happen. The point here is that the contracts 
                                                            
5 Ministry of Energy and Minerals. Available at  http://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:6JtaH_Ea7Yg 
6  Ministry of Energy and Minerals. The Demystification of Mining Contracts in Tanzania. Available at 
https://google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:nfagg7omGaoJ. (accessed on 24th Dec. 2011) 
7 Mwalimu Nyerere was the first President of Tanzania, now is recognised as a father of nation. And his most 
important speech was during the Arusha manifesto 1961. 
8 Brief on the mineral sector in Tanzania, available at www.mem.go.tz (accessed on 20 September 2010). 
9 Chambi Chachage ‘Mwalimu in our popular imagination-the relevance of Nyerere Today’, available at 
http://allafrica.com/stories/. (Accessed on 19/September/2010). 
10 Ministry of Energy and Minerals. Available at https://google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:nfagg7omGaoJ. 
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the people are complaining about and pressing for their review were entered into by the 
same Government, and the possibility  of  the same mistakes taking place are even 
higher. 
Many mining companies have been attracted to invest in Tanzania’s economy due to her 
large deposits of gold and the ongoing discovery of various minerals in Tanzania,; 
leaving aside other investors in other sectors who are now flooding the country. The 
investment interest had attracted two of the world’s major gold producers to invest in 
gold mining in Tanzania, Barrick Gold and Anglo Ashanti.11 
The Mining contract review strategy is not unique to Tanzania, since other countries, and 
especially of  the African continent, have experienced the same in the past. The 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) offers a vivid example, although the situation with 
regard to the contract review is somewhat different in that country. 
For those contracts which were entered into during the civil war and at the time when the 
country was facing great political instability during the dictatorial reign of  the then 
President Mobutu Seseseko,12 who plundered the country’s resources  and misused  a lot 
of money, part of which he deposited  in foreign countries. During his reign,  most 
Congolese were subjected to abject poverty.   
Unlike in Tanzania, mining in the DRC has been the backbone (or pronoun, to use 
Mobutu’s term) of the Congolese economy since colonial times. The country possesses 
                                                            
     11 Ministry of Energy and Minerals. Available at https://google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:nfagg7omGaoJ. 
12 Mobutu Sese Seko Nkuku Ngbendu wa Za Banga, was President of Democratic Republic of Congo (also 
known as Zaire for much of his reign) from 1965 to 1997. While in office he formed an authoritarian 
regime, amassed vast personal wealth, and attempted to purge the country of all colonial cultural influence, 
while maintaining an anti – communist stance available at  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobutu_Sese_Seko. 
(Accessed on 19 September 2010). 
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valuable mineral reserves of copper, cobalt, gold, diamonds, coal, petroleum, and other 
resources.   Currently, approximately US$, 2 billion is being invested in the exploitation 
of minerals on industrial and quasi- industrial scale.13 This gives a picture of the mineral 
wealth in the country. 
1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM  
Contract review strategies which have been carried out in Tanzania since 2008 raise 
social, political, economic and legal questions which have various implications. 
Firstly, there is an indication of political interferences in the whole review process. In 
that, there is a fear that any potential significant benefit from the reviews may not be 
effective as long as politicians may not be willing to pursue their implementation. For 
instance,  
‘The chief executive officer of a foreign company with vast mining interests in Tanzania, 
James Sinclair, has sought to assure international investors that President Jakaya 
Kikwete will not change existing fiscal policies in the sector despite a longstanding 
public outcry that the nation is not benefiting enough from mining receipts’. 14  
The above quotation is a clear indication of how much influence these investors have on 
politicians and hence on the whole review exercise.  
                                                            
13 Jean – Inc Muke minaluba ’DR Congo mining contract Review: A new chance of growth’  available at 
http://www.mbm avocats.cd (accessed on 02/04/2007). 
14 This was a press release following  the Bomani Commission Report  submitted to the President on May 24, on 30 
May, Making the submission of the statements via his company’s website  www.tanrange.com,  Sinclair furthermore 
declared that he was not worried about the future, saying that they had been friends of  the President for more than 
20 years. ‘What’s important to know, however, is that the man who will make the final decision on the 
recommendations is the President not the committee.’’  
He continues: ’’President Kikwete is anextremely knowledgeable and capable man who will do nothing to disturb 
the balanced fiscal policies that have produced enormous growth in Tanzania’s economic base, most of it fuelled by 
international investors.’’ http://www.jamiiforums.com/jukwaa-la-siasa/13353-bomani-committee-hiding-the-truth-
2.html  (accessed on 15 September 2010) . 
 
 
 
 
 5 
 
Secondly, there is an issue with regard to the institutional framework for managing the 
local mining sector. If the country does not have such a framework then there is a real 
problem. Thirdly, if greater care is not taken with contracts review, the country might 
lose investors, and may also be sued in courts of law. 
However, the situation is somewhat different in DRC, since the contracts that where 
entered into during the wars are protected by the military regime, one of the 
manifestations of which is for a general of the army to provide certain companies with 
soldiers to defend them.   
But since the democratic government in now in place in DRC, the same question about 
whether the review process can be fair in Tanzania is raised.   
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The general objective of the proposed research is to critically analyse the review of 
mining resources contracts in Tanzania and DRC. The specific objectives of the research 
are: 
 To examine the implications of the contract reviews on Foreign Direct Investments 
(FDI) both in Tanzania and the DRC; 
 To critically analyse the Bomani Commission Report on contract review in Tanzania; 
and 
 To make recommendations on the appropriate action to be taken in respect thereof. 
1.3 HYPOTHESIS 
The hypothesis of this study is that the reviews of mining contracts in both Tanzania and 
DRC impact negatively on FDIs. Foreign investors will cease investing in these countries 
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for fear of huge losses to be incurred if their contracts are reviewed and thereafter 
annulled. One needs to bear in mind that investment in mining costs the investors’ huge 
sums of money. For example, Barrick Gold has invested almost US$, 3 billion in the 
Tanzanian mining sector.15 If the contracts awarded to Barrick Gold are thus reviewed 
and annulled, the company will lose that sum. The resulting consequences will extend to 
every Tanzanian through social, political, economic and legal arenas at varying degrees.  
1.4 SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
Since an enquiry into mining could be very wide, in the sense that it covers many issues, 
a limited but refined scope is proposed for this research. The issue of reviewing the 
contracts in Tanzania will have to confine itself to the Bomani Commission Report in 
relation to its impact on FDIs. On the other hand, the contract review in DRC will be for 
the 2007-2010 period. 
1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
It is a paradoxical phenomenon for a country which is richly endowed with natural 
resources is listed among the world’s poorest countries. Besides gold, there is a host of 
other minerals that are mined in the country. The big question that begs an answer is why  
the country is still poor in terms of infrastructure and social services, and why is the 
Government so critically dependent on developed countries for budget support and loans 
while it has vast mineral reserves worth billions of dollars? 
This study is significant because it will enable the targeted countries (Tanzania and DRC)  
to not only appreciate the need to review mining contracts but also pay attention to other 
                                                            
15 Baricck Gold general notes, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barrick_Gold (Accessed on 15 
October 2010). 
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factors, such as the need to have an appropriate institutional framework to manage the 
mining sector. Otherwise, looking at the situation in both countries now, even if each 
country (Tanzania and DRC) acquires 95 per cent of accrued shares in the mining  
operations whilst the foreign companies get only 5 per cent as a result of the review, the 
impacts will remain the same.  Although the situation in DRC is more or less the same, 
there is a need to think of what society needs and what would be of benefit to it. 
Certainly, communities in mineral deposit locations should be the primary beneficiaries.  
The case seems to be different in some of the mining areas whereby  the remarks of a 
Member of the Tanzanian Parliament, Honourable James Lembeli, who once complained 
in Parliament  that if your constituency  is surrounded by mineral deposits, that is 
tantamount to a curse.16 The message he sought to relay was that mining companies did 
virtually nothing to develop mining areas; and that, in some cases, their operations 
produced chemicals that tended to affect the inhabitants and destroyed the environment. 
The honourable MP was referring to the situation in his constituency - Kahama in 
Shinyanga region  of Tanzania. 
1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
I wish to state, at the outset, that this is not a very unique research about mining sector.  
Others in the past have been conducted researches on this particular area as well as other 
related matters in the past. For this reason, the researcher has used a multi-methodology 
approach for the purpose of handling the research materials in order to find answers to 
the research questions and/or test the hypotheses. The research was based on a diversified 
targeted population in the sense that there was no limitation as to gender, age, education, 
                                                            
16 Available at www.parliament.go.tz/POLIS/PAMS/Docs/HS-19-9-2010.pdf, (accessed on 5 October 2010). 
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race and background of participants, provided that the person in question possessed the 
capacity to participate. 
The research was quantitative in nature based on trend study. In the course of research, 
the researcher capitalized on the existing literature and data to identify the trend from 
which to draw conclusions. In the course of research, therefore, the researcher applied 
what is commonly known as multivariate analysis technique since a mono technique 
could have led to biased results. 
From the outset,  the research commenced with documentary review in various libraries 
for the purpose of building a clear concept to which the research could be  linked up with. 
For this particular stage, three months were devoted specifically for documentary review; 
and after that, the study shifted into the field where the information gathered from 
libraries was collaborated with the real data/information obtained from the field. From 
various libraries, the researcher explored documentary materials relevant to mines and 
mineral explorations. A comparative study of the theories was made and from this, the 
historical background of the targeted countries (Tanzania and the DRC) was considered 
while taking note of the different doctrines that have guided the mining industry for ages 
not only in the two countries, but in many other countries  as well.  
Furthermore, the researcher had an opportunity to test the people’s understanding of the 
theories and how the respondents  in the study  area accept those theories (how do they 
accommodate and implement the idea?). Lastly, the researcher tested the efficacy of the 
theories and the application of the legislative measures related to mines and mineral 
development in Tanzania. This line of advancement in research was done while 
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considering the current undisputable need for change and the prevailing actual 
environments, together with the laws/legislation that is currently in operation.  
Location of the Study Area 
The field study was conducted in Arusha, Geita, Shinyanga and a few areas where small-
scale miners operate. The cited areas were preferred for the following reasons: 
Arusha is the home of tanzanite gemstones and the only area with such minerals in the 
world. Mining operations there have been controversial - characterized mainly by 
frequent conflicts between small-scale and large-scale miners. A research was very 
important on this area to determine who has the right over what.  
Geita and Shinyanga (especially Kahama Dstrict) are the most highly mineral stocked 
areas in the country. They are the focal points in this research for reasons that these areas 
attract a lot of people from within and outside Tanzania who crowd into the places for 
seeking employment in the mines as labourers or to engage themselves in small-scale 
mining activities. Mining problems in these places  thus reflect what is happening in the 
rest of the country, and particularly,  in the whole African continent.   
Research Design 
This research was designed to be conducted on a multi-disciplinary research approach. 
This design allowed the researcher to collect data at any single point with utmost 
accuracy. The design has a peculiar quality of cross-section response; it is therefore ideal 
for the researcher, considering the limited time and resources at his disposal.  
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Sampling Technique 
Two types of sampling techniques were applied for the whole period of research with the 
intention of extracting enough and reliable information. On one hand, the study applied  
purposive or deliberate sampling. This type of sampling was applied to the groups of 
respondents who are few in number. These included financial institutions, government 
departments and agencies, law enforcement organs and administrative organs in large 
scale mining companies.  
On the other hand, the researcher applied random sampling. This was applied to small-
scale miners, ordinary citizens and smiths (gold, silver and other gemstone smiths). 
Because of their large number, any other method of data sampling applied upon this 
group could have led to biasness. By applying random sampling, there was every 
possibility that the response from this group would be more unbiased than the first group. 
While the group in the first sampling technique (i.e. financial institutions, government 
departments and agencies, law enforcement organs and administrative organs in large 
scale mining companies) is criticized for the poor implementation of the mining policy, 
the group in the second sampling technique (i.e. small-scale miners, ordinary citizens and 
metal smiths) is seen to have given an impartial view to the questions that were directed 
to it. This fact makes this group an important sample population in this research. 
The respondent groups as listed above have been preferred as the main focus of research 
because they are the main stakeholders in the mining industry in the country but they 
have been acrimoniously blaming each other  for both the failure and the success of the 
mining policy. 
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Data collection 
Data was collected basically via one method, which is secondary data collection. 
Secondary data Collection:  This is the initial method that was applied by the 
researcher. In fact,  the researcher  begun with this as soon as he began to formulate the 
researchable topic. It mainly involved library research. In the libraries, the researcher 
explored various things, including history, theories, doctrines, legislations and precedents 
relevant to the mining industry.  
Two kinds of libraries were accessed, to wit; the first were physical libraries mainly of 
higher learning institutions, and a library at the ministry of energy and minerals. These 
libraries are stocked with enough materials relevant to this research.  The second was the 
electronic library (on line library) which the researcher used to access  the protected and 
more compacted deposits of materials. The most updated and more recent literatures were 
found in these libraries. 
Data processing 
Descriptive statistics was applied to all variables. Analysis was done using Statistical 
Package for Social Science (SPSS) which is computer software whose relevance and 
application conform  to the objectives of the study 
1.7 LIMITATION OF THE STUDY 
The potential impact of contract review on foreign direct investment in mining resources 
is a very wide topical area of study. Indeed,  no investment in minerals is expected to be 
spared by the review screening. Talking of mineral contract review in the country without 
discussing the nature of operation of various mines, the mining activities at various levels 
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and without specifically identifying the boundaries of coverage, it may either leave the 
author with too wide area of research that the researcher may fail to cover or confuse the 
reader over what exactly the focus of the research is. This challenge has been tackled as 
follows: 
Throughout this paper, mineral contracts review has been used to reflect the laws, rules, 
guidance and regulations necessary for transparency in the mining industry.  But even 
then, the scope seems to be too wide, and thus devoid of any meaningful focus. For this 
reason, this research has concentrated on how mines are managed, management of 
foreign mining companies, and the relationship between the mineral deposits found in the 
country and the development level of the citizens.  
 
The discussion however, is limited by the inefficiencies of the mining policy, the 
involvement of other stakeholders (apart from the government) in the mining industry 
and the laws related to the control of minerals in the country. It has not been possible for 
this particular research work to exhaust all relevant areas connected with the mining 
industry but the researcher believes that the work will serve as a milestone for future 
researchers, and mineral explorers-cum-exploiters.  
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1.8 ANALYSIS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
In the subsequent chapters, the researcher is trying  to give an analysis of how the 
reviewing of the mining contracts in Sub-Saharan countries but with specific reference to 
Tanzania is done. In chapter two, observations are made on how in Tanzania the Bomani 
Commission encouraged the review of the mining contracts, especially after realizing that 
prior to the review, the nation was benefitting very little from mineral exploitation.  
In the third chapter, attempts are made to exemplify how a mining contract is entered into 
in the DRC so as to compare it with the process in Tanzania. This approach has been 
influenced by the fact that DRC has a long standing experience in review missions. Their 
shortfalls might give the Tanzanians and others the right bearing. Chapter four is reserved 
for the author’s exclusive comments and recommendations aimed at facilitating better 
ways of the mineral sector’s management. It is hoped that pursuit of the comments and 
recommendations will enable the respective countries to benefit immensely from the 
mining sector.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE MINING SECTOR AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS IN TANZANIA 
AND THE CONCEPT OF MINING CONTRACTS REVIEW BASED ON THE BOMANI 
COMMISSION REPORT 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the following chapter, the researcher will discuss in detail the Mining Sector and 
Foreign Direct Investments in Tanzania and the Concept of Mining Contracts Review 
Based on the Bomani Commission Report.17 The mining sector has a very high 
potentiality of becoming the biggest contributor to the nation’s Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP). What is basically needed is serious supervision and harmonization of this sector 
with other sectors so as to yield consolidated development.  
 
There is a need for  a serious and committed political administration  and clearly 
structured political ideology to tap these  resources; otherwise the mining sector will 
continue benefiting big multinational companies which are undertaking the exploitation, 
while the indigenous people remain marginalised. This chapter, therefore, has a specific 
objective of shedding light on the current situation, the factors that have caused it, and the 
consequences thereof. 
2.2 THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The Mining Sector and Foreign Direct Investments are very wide areas of study that each 
on its own is capable of forming the basis of an independent study. For this reason, this 
chapter is specifically focussed on Tanzania and the discussion will be specifically 
centred on the following: various sectarian policies dealing or directly touched by the 
                                                            
17 This was a presidential Commission and just released its report in 2007 
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mining sector. The discussion in the order of preference will be centred on the following: 
Tanzania Investment Policy of 1996 and Tanzania Investment Act, 1997, the 
Environmental Policy of 1996, the Mineral Policy of 1997, the Mining Act 2010, 
effectiveness of the legal framework, the mining companies situated in Tanzania, the 
concept of mining contracts review and the Bomani Commission Report. 
2.2.1 National Investment Policy 
 
Tanzania, with an area of 945,000 Square kilometres, has an estimated population of 
around 40 million people and covers a mass area of diverse topographical nature. Since 
independence, the country has gone through  a number of political policies that affected 
her economy and investments. Eventually, she emerged in the  1990s with a policy that is 
more favourable for the expansion of private sector expansion and sustainable economic 
development. 
 
The current predominantly market-oriented economy is enjoyed particularly in the 
investment sector, the external sector, monetary management and agricultural market 
arrangements. This policy has spearheaded the removal of restrictive regulations and 
bottleneck over the private sector. This, to a great extent, is favouring and in fact has 
acted as an attraction to investors in the mining sector, since the foreign exchange system 
has been fully liberalized for payments and funds transfer for current international 
transactions. Pursuant to the reforms that have been brought about by the investment 
policy, the long term  development objectives have been designed for revitalizing and 
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raising the level of productivity in the leading productive sector, the  mining industry 
being among them.18  
It is now confirmed that Tanzania has an enormous deposit of minerals currently being 
exploited and some still unexploited. However, the mineral sector is contributing very 
little to the national economy. The minerals that are found in plenty in the country 
include gold,19  tanzanite in northern Tanzania, nickel in north western Tanzania, coal 
and iron in southern highlands, natural gas in the coastal line, and so forth. This is apart 
from the other hydrocarbon deposits and building materials. The National Investment 
Policy therefore addresses some of the investment  concerns in order to serve these areas 
with mineral deposits  for the purpose of easy exploitation. The policy identifies the 
communication sector, transport sector, tax regime, infrastructure and energy as potential 
areas that have to be improved in order to attract investors in the mining sector and 
consequently improve the nation’s economy. This will be in line with one of the 
components of the state’s goals as explained in the Investment Policy paper at P.1220  and 
one of the nation’s specific objectives.21  
In fact, this is geared at transforming the country’s social-economic set up, which, 
according to the policy, will not depend only on established  conducive and amicable 
environments, but will give priority also to the promotion and development of productive 
                                                            
18 others are agriculture manufacturing and construction 
19 found in the Archean greenstone belts around lake Victoria and western central and southern Tanzania 
20 that is to ensure economic property and improve the living standard of the people 
21 that is attaining a high rate of annual GDP growth averaging 8-9% P.a –p.13 
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economic sectors, especially  the manufacturing industry, mining, agriculture, natural 
resources and tourism.22  
In order to ensure that the Tanzanians are benefiting from their resources, a call is made 
for the promotion of joint ventures in economic sectors such as mining, manufacturing, 
agriculture and tourism.23 The advocacy is made against the glaring fact that, if 
Tanzanians are left on their own to attain optimal exploitation of minerals, they will fail 
outright, because these indigenous investors are engaged  mostly in small and medium 
scale production whose profit margin is very minimal. 
The investment policy in a nutshell has six objectives which serve as a mirror for the 
investors before they may conclusively determine on whether to invest or otherwise. We 
will cite objects (c) (d) (e) and (f), which are critical to this research.24  
Read together, these sub-paragraphs give an impression that the country has devised a 
policy that is conducive to foreign investors25 without ignoring the well-being of its own 
people. The foregoing may not be reasonably achieved  unless the policy pinpoints 
specific spots that could be easily monitored. The investment policy therefore is 
spotlighting eleven objects as guiding beacons for eventual successful implementation of 
the six objectives mentioned above. Relevant to this research are paragraphs (a),26 (d)27 
(f).28  
                                                            
22 Para 2.2.1 of the National investment policy 
23 S.2.2.4 
24 P.16-17 
25 Encourage inflow of external resources, encourage and facilitate adoption of new technologies in 
activities with direct bearing on productivity enhancing transparency and reviewing investment process for 
investment approval. 
26 optimum utilizations of the nations natural and other resources 
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The country has the potential to enter into a new era of investment transformation if it 
successfully tackles the contemplated specific objects. Streaming down this 
transformation will eventually lead to sectarian improvement including the mining sector. 
The policy highlights five important strategies as means of effecting improvements in the 
mining sector, one of whose benefits will be to attract investors. It is anticipated that 
these will further stabilize the investments in the sector, enabling the investors to 
contribute to the nation’s development more beneficially. These strategies are:  
i. The provision of mechanisms for managing the allocation of mining 
rights. This shall be done for the purpose of encouraging broad-based 
growth in mining. If successfully done, it will encourage investment in 
the sector. 
ii. Adoption of supportive measures for small-scale miners. The situation 
currently indicates that most of the indigenous miners are engaged in 
small-scale activities and lack technical know-how.  
This strategy is thus aimed at enabling them to promote their activities and  
they are optimistic that this will be a plus in the nation’s economy and 
offer valuable support to large-scale miners. 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
27 achievement of identifiable and substantial foreign exchange savings through efficient productive 
activities 
28 Improvement of linkages among various economic sectors involved in the production of goods and 
services 
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iii. The foregoing29 will be complemented with the provision by the State, of 
a legal and institutional mechanism to ensure that there is harmony 
between small-scale and large-scale mining activities.  
iv. The policy is also focused on promoting and encouraging consolidation of 
the sector, considering that, minerals that are extracted and exported 
without being processed have less value; whereas value added mineral 
products fetch higher profits for the country.  
v. Private exploration. As has been discussed above, Tanzania is endowed 
with vast deposits of minerals and it is believed that a great number of 
them are yet to be discovered30 and exploited.  
For this reason, dependency on government funds for exploration will slow down the 
process of meeting mining policy objectives. The policy therefore contemplates putting in 
place incentives to encourage private sector investments in exploration, efficient mining 
and marketing of the country’s mineral resources.31  
2.2.2 The Government 
 
According to the investment policy, the government has delegated the execution of duties 
to agencies, confining itself to the task of formulating the policies and monitoring their 
                                                            
29 Support for small-scale miners 
30 According to Business International Herald Tribune, October 26, 2006. Available at: 
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2006/10/26/business/AF_FEA_FIN_Tanzania_Mining.php, accessed  
(March 25, 2008) quoted in “the Demystification of Mining Contracts in Tanzania”  Tanzania becomes 
Africa’s third largest producer of gold. 
 
31 P. 19-20 of the policy paper 
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implementation. Section 4.1.132 stipulates that the government’s role is the provision of 
clear policy guidelines, stimulation and promotion of investment sectors and overseeing 
the general development in investments.  
For proper execution and effective investment, the government of the United Republic of 
Tanzania established the Investment Promotion Authority (IPA) which is charged with 
the promotion, coordination and monitoring of all kinds of investment, be it local or 
foreign.  It was intended that the operation of this agency would assist the nation to 
eliminate bureaucracy surrounding the whole process of promoting the country as an 
ideal place for investment. 
The investment policy identifies twelve basic functions as basic to investment. Functions 
nine and ten are almost summarize the whole activities of the IPA; i.e. to expedite the 
processing and approving of investments by making sure that certificates and incentives 
are granted expeditiously  while monitoring the impact of investment on both the 
economy and the environment.  
It is the mission of the policy also to make IPA facilitate and speed up acquisition of all 
necessary   permits and decisions precedent for the investors. That further means that 
without IPA in place, investors will never be certain of a conducive environment for 
investment. The question however, is: How effectively is the IPA discharging its 
obligations?33  
Economic development cannot be attained if appropriate plans are not executed at 
sectarian level at which monitoring and supervision is easy to undertake. In order to 
                                                            
32 At page 25 of the policy paper 
33 Page 29 of the policy paper 
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attain success at sectarian level, financial institutions have to be strengthened. Without 
strengthening them, very few investors would be attracted because no investor would 
fancy incurring losses. Thus, from the 1980s, the countries embarked on a number of 
financial reforms but taking into account the internationally acceptable and prudential 
regulations and supervisions. Through these improvements (and the liberalization of 
trade) more banks and other financial institutions have established their business in the 
country, thereby availing investors a wide option of choosing which bank/financial 
institution to use as a trading partner.34  
Considering that the country is not a lonely island and that developments in the 
neighbouring countries would definitely affect her, she has endeavoured to enter into 
Regional and Sub-regional markets for the purpose of protection of investments and 
enable equitable business dispute settlement.  
To this end, the country is a member of the Multinational Industrial Enterprise Charter 
(MIEC), the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), and the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC), to mention just a few. Together with these 
memberships, the policy sees to it that the country is a signatory to the International 
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). 
The policy aims to ensure that investment in the country is done more transparently. This 
could not be achieved without an efficient and effective legal system without which there 
cannot be an assurance for the sanctity of property rights and enforcement of contracts. 
This is very important to all investors in the mining sector because it has been pointed out 
                                                            
34 This incentive has come with the trade liberalization since from the mid 1960’s to early 1990’s only 
public banks and financial institutions were rendering monetary service in the country 
 
 
 
 
 22 
 
in the previous paragraphs that all investors (especially the foreigners) would not 
commence their business without entering into secure contracts.  
 In pursuance of this, the country has undertaken some legal reforms involving the 
establishment of proper legal institutions, for example, the industrial court, the 
commercial court and strengthening the existing claim courts. These are not going 
directly to the roots of the mining sector but they are significant. If these are  absent , 
investors would hesitate to establish their business in the country. 
The last point to highlight on the investment policy is the amicable solutions for 
investment disputes in case the government is a party of those investment disputes .  The 
investment policy provides that, in the event of a dispute, the two sides will strive to 
resolve it amicably. As a procedure, arbitration may follow if an amicable solution 
doesn’t materialise.  The arbitration, however, is pursued through the internationally 
recognized procedures. Among others, the policy recognizes the rules and procedures for 
arbitration of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) 
and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA).  
Where the investor is a local entity, the dispute settlement may take legal channels 
through local courts and at that moment all parties (the government and the local 
investors) are deemed to be equal before the law. 
The policy recognizes the exigent need of having sure sources of power. Thus apart from 
the government restructuring the sole electricity power supply utility firm, TANESCO, 
the policy is encouraging private sectors to play a role in electrification initiatives. 
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In summarising what is viewed under the investment policy, the obligations of the 
investors are pointed out in the policy paper. Five factors are listed as precedents for the 
investors to abide by. Combined, these require the investor to be transparent in accounts, 
be accessible and cooperate with the local authorities whenever required to do so.35  
Judging the policy from its wording, any reasonable person would acknowledge that it 
reflects a sound strategy. Since it was formulated in 1997 up to now (2012) very little has 
been realized, especially in respect of how indigenous people are supposed to benefit 
from mining projects. It is obvious that there is an exigent need of revisiting and 
restructuring the policy.     
2.2.3 The Environmental Policy 1996 
 
The National Environmental Policy of 1996 was adopted for the purpose of harmonizing 
environmental management in Tanzania while making sure that economic activities in the 
country are undertaken sustainably.36 The policy makers were aware that the lives of all 
Tanzanians without exception depend solely on the environment, and therefore their lives 
and those of the future generations would not be maintained if the environment were 
neglected.  
For this reason, it is a mission of the policy that maintaining and caring for the 
environment is not a matter of choice but an obligation37because  environment is part and 
                                                            
35 Section 5.0 at page 51 
36 The introduction to the policy spells clearly that the meaning or the word environmental includes inter 
alia any   solids, liquids, gases, heat, sound vibration  or radiation resulting directly or indirectly form the 
activities of man 
37 paragraph 2 of the introductions says that Tanzanians do not have the luxury Ignoring the fundamental 
stresses at the interface of developments and environment 
 
 
 
 
 24 
 
parcel of our lives, and to some extent may be a factor in determining real economic 
positions.  it is  an undisputable fact the most  problems  that  are connected with 
underdevelopment, such as poverty and poor  health, stem from the failure to harmonize 
the environment and development. That means once the two are harmonized, the people’s 
development level may rise  significantly. 
It follows that every project undertaken, be it development or investment-oriented, must 
have pre-planned strategies for environmental protection as the introduction to the policy 
says, “environment is the first victim of acute poverty...and desertification.”38 That is 
why the policy39 prioritizes sustainable development with a focus on managing the 
environment for the benefit of future generations. That means that whatever is done in the 
mines today should focus on the potential effects to the  posterity.40 This focus, however, 
is not peculiar to Tanzania, since it is believed to be a product of the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development. The conference enshrined the integration 
of environmental concerns and economic development in the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development.41 Moreover, the country is actively taking part in the 
implementation of a number of worldwide and regional environmental treaties, from 
which the policy has borrowed substantially. 
The environmental policy, as pointed out above, is focused on making sure that whatever 
might be done to the environment should take into account the need for dependency on 
other sectors. That is, one sector should act in collaboration with other sectors; otherwise 
                                                            
38 Paragraph 4 of the introduction 
39 Environmental policy 
40 The government is pursuing explicit policy objectives which take into account its role of steering social 
sectors in environmental management 
41 Tanzania participated actively in this conference 
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the results may not be promising. This tie with the spirit of Agenda 21, which stresses the 
need to move from a development model that legalizes  independent actions of individual 
sectors to intersectional integration between sectors.  
It is therefore a fact that whatever is provided in the environmental policy has been 
provided in such ways that the mining, investment, agriculture, and other sectors shall not 
be affected. Likewise policies in those other sectors (the mining sector included) shall 
make sure that the environment is preserved at all costs.  
The words of paragraph 9 of the environmental policy summarise the nature of the inter-
sectarian cooperation that is anticipated and the nature by which it may be carried out.42 
2.2.4 Why Implement National Environmental Policy Now? 
Since independence, or right from colonial times, the country has been formulating 
development plans and therefore the National Environmental Policy cannot be said to be 
a new invention, rather, it is a document seeking to improve the framework for 
fundamental changes without which sustainable development will be difficult to 
achieve.43 
During the  old regime44 , decisions affecting the environment were made haphazardly. It 
was the objective of the policy therefore that environmental consideration was brought 
into the focus of decision makers so as to make it part and parcel of the mainstream of 
decision making in the country. 
                                                            
42 S. 9 (a) (b) (c) (d) 
43 S.17 
44 before the introduction of the environmental policy 
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As to why the policy has been preferred at this particular time, the answer is simple. As 
nations advance forward and becoming aggressive with development, the environment is 
being degraded at a fast speed. Indeed, the present generation is abdicating its 
responsibility  of becoming trustees of the environment for the future generation. For this 
reason, the policy spells out the objectives whose  benefits are reproduced here below:  
a) To ensure sustainability, security and equitable use of resources for meeting 
the basic needs of the present and future generations without degrading the 
environment or risk health or safety. 
b) To prevent and control degradation of land, water, vegetation, and air which 
constitute our life support systems 
c) To promote international cooperation on the environment agenda and expand 
participation and contribution to relevant bilateral, sub-regional, regional and 
global organizations including implementation of international treaties.45   
d) Examined very closely, it is crystal clear that the policy wants to leave no 
stone unturned in connection with environment viz a vis development. The 
emphasis is on the equitable use of resources. Definitely there shall be no 
equitable use if any development project disregards environmental 
development.46  
                                                            
45 S. 18 P. 90-100 
46 pursuant to the provisions of s.20 the policy is focusing on satisfactions of basic needs while at the same time 
protecting environment in the cause of development 
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2.2.5 Environment Vs Technology  
Most development projects use various technologies, and if not cared for, they may cause 
disasters to the environment. The mining sector is leading in this regard because of the 
nature of the machines applied,47  the volume of work undertaken and the type of 
chemicals applied. The use of science and technology however may not be avoided in the 
production of minerals because the technology in the mining sector at all levels has a 
bearing on the quality of the product and in the type and amount of the resulting waste 
and emission.48  
For this reason, the environmental policy advocates for  technologies that are 
environment-friendly. These will see to it that the results of activities of any project 
technology should be “process and product.” This is what should be the target and/or 
vision of every mining project. Section 29 of the policy is more explicit on this when it 
says: “The primary policy objective shall be the promotion of the use of environmentally 
sound technologies, that is, technologies that protect the environment, are less polluting, 
use all resources in a more sustainable manner, recycle more of their wastes and 
products and handle residue wastes in a more acceptable manner than the technologies 
for which they are substitutes” (emphasis added). 
Considering that much of the mining work done in Tanzania is artisanal,49 environmental 
policy provides for the dissemination of environmental education for the purpose of 
couching people to become responsible for their own destiny. This should be done by 
                                                            
47 emitting noise and dust 
48 p. 13 
49 Art. 54 of the national Environmental policy 
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involving government institutions and NGOs that will give people who are dealing with 
or who are directly affected by environmental activities.50 
Knowing that almost every mining project is a potential user of dangerous and poisonous 
chemicals that are very dangerous to human lives like mercury, the policy had no 
reservations in making provisions that provide for the control and use of these substances. 
Thus the policy intends to prevent, reduce, control and eliminate damage and/or minimize 
the risk thereof from the generation, management, transportations, handling and disposal 
of hazardous waste, other wastes and emissions. The policy establishes six criteria by 
which the environment may be protected in mining areas, important of them all is S. 54 
(f)51 which in  fact summaries the rest.  
This section provides for the regular and periodic environmental audits to be maintained 
to ensure the adoptions of environmentally sound practices in mining operations. This 
means if the policy is followed to the letter, environmental disasters that are looming at 
mining cites would be avoided. However, like in all other policies, the question remains:  
Who should execute the policy effectively? 
If the objective of the policy in respect to the mining industry is to prevent, reduce, 
control and eliminate damages but up to now there are big problems connected with 
mineral extraction, then there must be something wrong with the policy52 
                                                            
50 According   to the Environmental Policy paper, NGOs poses diverse experience, expert and capacity. 
51 Page 22 of the policy paper 
52 According to Policy Forum in Demystification of Mining Contracts in Tanzania, Experience has shown 
that extractive industries do not yield a significant positive impact unless there are concerted efforts to 
build up local industry capacity. In the view of Policy Forum the government of Tanzania has not 
contracted with the companies to implement and/or set up a capacity-building mechanism so that over time, 
the need to rely on the (currently unlimited) foreign expertise will diminish.  
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2.2.6 The Mining Policy 
The mining policy is a remnant of the Mineral Sector Policy (MSP) that was formulated 
by the government of the United Republic of Tanzania in 1997. The aim and objective of 
the MSP was and still is to drive the development and exploitation of minerals in the 
country.53  
In formulating this policy, the government had a vision of having a very strong, vibrant, 
well-organized private sector moulded to lead a large and small-scale mining industry in 
the country while making sure that activities related to it are conducted in a safe and 
environmentally-sound manner. The policy also envisaged to make sure that the mineral 
sector’s contribution to the national coffers is in excess of 10percent of the GDP. Lastly, 
it was the desire of the government through this policy, to ensure that a well-developed 
gemstone cutting and jewellery industry is established in the country, to make Tanzania 
to be the gemstone centre for Africa. Registering these achievements would translate into 
the mining sector becoming a highly dependable generator of employment opportunities. 
To demonstrate its determination in implementing this policy, the government of the 
United Republic of Tanzania repealed and replaced some laws that were directly touching 
the roots of the mineral industry in the country. These are: the Mining (Controlled Areas) 
Ordinance, the Mining (Loans) Ordinance, The Gold Trading Ordinance, the Diamond 
Industry Protection Ordinance, and the Gemstone Industry (Development and Protection) 
                                                            
53 Policy Forum TANZANIA. Found at http://www.tanzaniageteway.org/news/news/article.asp?ID=57 
(accessed on 13/05/2011). 
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Act, 1967.54  The policy recognized the importance of other legislations in the country 
that needed to function in collaboration with the Mining Act 1998.55  
In the year 2009, the country formulated the Mining Policy that was a result of several 
attempts to make the mining sector become among the major contributors to the nation’s 
GDP.56 The mining policy was expected to act as a linkage between the mining sector 
and other sectors in enhancing the nation’s economy.57 Factors that were contemplated as 
measures for the achievement of the foregoing objective are: increasing employment 
opportunities in the mines, fair and adequate compensation for relocated communities. 
Again, very little has been realized on this score, since communities living in  mineral 
potential areas have been facing hard times as insecurity is rife in permanent residential 
settlements around mines.  
Evidence shows that large and medium scale mining companies require large tracts of 
land but the Tanzania mineral geological positions covers areas already inhabited by 
locals. This means that when mines have to be set up, local inhabitants are displaced, 
leading to disruptions of their socio-cultural and economic activities. Such displacement 
                                                            
54 the Fourth Schedule and Part I of the Fifth Schedule to the Mining Act, 1998 for the saving and 
transitional provisions. 
55 The Mining Act, 1998 governed the mining sector legislation; while the National Environmental Act, 
2004 the Employment and Labour Relations Act, 2004 the Companies’ Act, 2002, and a host of other laws 
remained relevant to the business of mining in the country 
56 Some of these steps were the setting up a Presidential commission to revisit mining contracts in the 
country in 2007 with the objective of establishing modalities to maximize mining proceeds and reviewing 
how things were operating. Out of this, some mining companies to wit Barrick Gold Mine and Resolute 
Mines signed new agreements waiving tax concession and therefore making them pay tax earlier. Another 
step was the establishment of the Bomani Commission which came up with constructive proposals that 
sought for both policy and legislative reforms in the sector. 
57 This could be done by making the mining sector to be a big market to locally produced goods and 
services such as labour, power. Very unfortunately this objective has failed to be achieved because the big 
investors have shown very little cooperation 
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is usually carried out by the government and in most cases the locals are not compensated 
but are physically tortured and harassed.  
2.2.7 The Mining Act 2010 
The Mining Act58 was published in the government Gazette59 on 28th May 2010. The Act 
repealed and replaced its predecessor to wit the Mining Act No. 5 of 1998.60 The Mining 
Act, 1998 (as amended) was the principal and comprehensive law governing the mining 
sector by repealing and replacing inter alia, the Mining Act, 1979. The Act came into 
force on July 1st, 1999.61.  However, very little has been changed in respect to the mining 
policy in the country since the administration, control and monitoring established under 
the old regime were also blessed by the new Act and therefore continue to exist and 
function as if the old Mining Act62 is still in force. Section 116 (2) provides inter alia for 
the continuance of effectiveness of subsidiary legislations which in fact are providing for 
the day-to-day monitoring of the mining activities in the country. These are not shaken by 
the 2010 Act. This is akin to preserving old wine in a new calabash. 
To prove how the new law is just a duplicate of the old law that has very little input, S. 
116(3) confirms the legality of the licenses and agreements obtained/entered through the 
old law. The section provides: “Notwithstanding the repeal of the mining Act under 
subsection (1) all mineral licenses  and authorizations granted or issued and agreements 
entered in accordance with the provisions of the repealed Act shall be deemed to have 
                                                            
58 Act No. 15 of 2010 
59 GN No. 22 Vol. 91 
60 Cap 123 
61 Policy Forum paper at P. 1 available at  www.policyforum.go.tz  accessed on 14 may 2011. 
62 http://www.tzonline.org/pdf/nationalenvironmentalpolicy.pdf  accessed on 14 may 2011. 
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been granted issued or authorized under this Act. Subject to modifications as may be 
determined under this Act in respect of the particular grantor authorizations ‘’  
 
The law itself does not specifically provide for the modalities of making modifications 
expressed under S. 161(3). That further implies that the executives within the relevant 
authority/ministry will be left with a discretion of how and when to make such 
modifications.  
Considering that most African governments are run negligently, it won’t be surprising 
that such modifications might not be made, thereby compelling mining operations to 
operate under old legal and administrative  systems.   
 
The legislature purposely suppressed what otherwise could have come as a challenge to 
unmonitored  and unbalanced exploitation of minerals in the country. This fact is 
unveiled by the provision of S. 161(4) that blesses all decisions that were made basing on 
the provisions of the repealed law. 
 
The blessing was done notwithstanding the fact that some decisions might have been 
made lately  without taking into consideration the interests of the Tanzanian general 
public. The relevant section provides: “all agreements made and entered in terms of the 
repealed Act, all appointments and decision made under the repealed Act should be 
deemed to have been made under this Act, until terminated, surrendered , reviewed, 
removed, cancelled or expired”  (emphasis added). This means all agreements and 
decisions made under the old law will continue to have full force of law as if the old law 
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has never been repealed. This is because the agreements and decisions made under the 
old law are  varied, there needs to be either an authoritative decision to terminate, review 
and cancel or discretion to abandon  the agreement that has expired. 
 
It is a common knowledge that most of the mineral exploitation agreements last not less 
than 99 years. Blessing such agreements which sometimes might be dubious on the face 
of records is like not having any new law in place. Above  all, the terminations, reviews, 
removal and cancellation that is referred to by this Act, is not properly regulated. There 
are procedures for every factor but there is no provision exerting pressure on relevant 
authorities to make sure that such an action does not take place, and then the responsible 
person shall be held accountable. The intentions  might be to terminate, review, remove, 
or cancel, and yet the responsible person/authority decides to keep silent. At such time 
and according to the provisions of this law, no law shall be deemed to have been 
transgressed and the responsible person/authority will continue to enjoy the trappings of 
the position one holds, instead he/she has to be  reprimanded or penalized through 
different punishments.    
 
At such point and under such circumstances, the trust conferred to the responsible 
person/authority will absolutely be deemed to have been abused. 
 
The above notwithstanding to the Act itself will be examined to see in which way it is 
promoting or hampering the mining industry in Tanzania. The Act is subdivided into 
eleven parts, nine of which are highly important. The parts that are not more important to 
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the contents of this research  are parts I and XI 63 . For the purpose of this research, 
analysis will be done on the following parts: Part II,64 Part III,65 Part IV,66 Part VI,67 Part 
VII,68 Part VIII,69  and Part IX70. 
 
It is quite obvious from the above scenario that the new Mining Act is constructed in a 
way that all important areas relevant  for the mining industry are touched. The question, 
however, remains: How best is this Act implemented? 
 
i) The control of minerals 
Control of minerals implies that the mining, storage, processing and exportation (or 
importation) of minerals is vested in the specified authority. Pursuant to the provisions of 
section 5,71  the control of minerals is vested in the government of the United Republic of 
Tanzania. 
 
 This authority applies irrespective of whether the minerals in question are in or under the 
land. The country whose power of controlling the extraction of minerals  is not defined 
                                                            
63 part one deal with the preliminaries –short title and commencement application, reapplication to 
petroleum and interpretation; while part eleven deals with repeals and savings provisions 
64 control of minerals, minerals rights and exclusivity be developments agreement exclusive area for 
primary licences and specified gemstone 
65 Geological services Mining Advisory Board and zonal Mines offices 
66 Conditions for grant of prospecting licence grant renewal and relinquishment of prospecting licence and 
obligations of holder of a prospection licence. Application for special mining licence duration of special 
mining licence and right of holder of special mining licence application for mining licence Grant of mining 
licence and Renewal of land subject to mineral rights, maximum area for mineral rights and termination of 
mining licence where production is insufficient 
67 Royalties, payment in lies of royalties and for sorting fees. 
68 security of gold and gemstones mining operations, removal of minerals and wasteful practices 
69 Commissioner may decide disputes, enforcement of commissioners order and Rules 
70 Radioactive minerals insurance and in dimities, regulations and obstruction of holder of mineral rights 
71 Act No. 15/2010. 
 
 
 
 
 35 
 
by this Act, but recourse is made to the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania 
(1977) which provides the definition of the powers and the name of  the United Republic 
of Tanzania.72 But again it would remain controversial and confusing if the person whose 
power  emanates from the authority of the United Republic. This person without 
reservation is the President of the United Republic of Tanzania. This is because under the 
Land Act,73 all land in the United Republic of Tanzania is held under the trusteeship of 
the President of United Republic of Tanzania.  Since minerals may be found above or 
below the land, it naturally follows that all minerals are part and parcel of land and 
therefore legally held under the President’s trust. In accomplishing this task, the President 
is expected to delegate his powers to suitable persons and suitable corporate bodies. 
 
For a person, a body corporate and/or any entity to access minerals in Tanzania, he/she 
must seek  minerals right under Act No. 15 of 2010. The right over minerals that is 
sought under section 6 can be granted depending on the division in which it applies. That 
is under division “A” a right might be granted for prospecting license or for a gemstone 
prospecting license or for retention license. Under division “B” the right may be granted 
in respect to special   mining license or just a mining license. Under division “C”  the 
right is for primary mining license. Under division “D” the rights that may be granted fall 
under three categories namely; processing license, smelting license and refining license.  
 
It is not necessary that only one right should be granted exclusively in one area. Pursuant 
to the provision of Section 7(2), the licensing authority may grant more than one mineral 
                                                            
72 The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania of 1977. 
73 Act No. 4 of 1999 
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right over the same mining area.74 The problem is with the discretion that is given to the 
minister75 under Section 7(3) whereof he/she may approve a source for the public 
interests.  
 
The construction whose undertaking involves public  interest  like the construction of 
tunnels, roads, dams, and aerodromes, should follow  procedures for identifying and 
granting permission for the land. Apart from that, the sources of building materials for 
such projects should not be rigorous. The minister is just requested and the permission is 
granted although it is a requirement of the law that the minister shall not approve a source 
in the mining area shall be identified as remains base that the mining area shall be 
identified as such following a successful survey and mapping of the area.76 Where the 
survey has not been undertaken, it again remains a fact that the minerals might be lying 
under the land and yet the minister, on account of lacking awareness on  the matter, 
he/she might proceed to grant a right for the source of materials from that portion of land. 
The person/company that asked for the right might be aware of the minerals deposits77  
and that fact becomes a catalyst for him to apply for such a right. By the time the minister 
realizes his/her errors and withdraw the right under S. 7(5) it would have been already  
too late to save the resources of the country. 
 
The control of the minerals goes as far as requiring the rightfully owner to take care of 
and make sure that the indigenous people surrounding the mines benefit from the 
                                                            
74 provided that the mineral right owner has consented to 
75 the minister responsible for mining 
76 Section 21 of the Mining Act, 2010. 
77 this is quite possible considering the current technological advancement 
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extracted minerals. Thus the Act under S. 10(4)(c)–(f) requires the rightful owner to take 
care of the environment -  covering even matters that are not covered by regulations of 
general applications,78 ensuring that goods and services that are available in Tanzania 
will not be procured from somewhere else and making sure that the Tanzanians who are 
now employed in the mines are further trained and prepared for future succession.  
 
The law here does not spell out the way in which the succession shall be made. Once the 
company acquires the minerals right, the first thing to anticipate is the amount of deposits 
available in the particular place. Following this, the prospector will be in a position of 
determining the duration of his application.  
 
Reasonably the more deposits underground, the more lengthy right will be applied for. 
Despite the fact that the law provides for succession, but logically the indigenous people 
won’t achieve anything if the law does not limit the years in which a particular company 
may operate in a particular deposit; leaving a substantial amount for succession. 
ii)  Advise on mineral Exploitation and use 
Minerals are precious and they form the bulk of the economy in any country where they 
are available. In the event that every person, be it a citizen or a foreigner, has a right to 
search and own minerals, the result would be catastrophic. For this reason the geological 
survey79  is done by the geological agency.80 This agency, pursuant to the provisions of 
Section 21 has the responsibility of advising the minister on geological matters. But the 
minister may not act upon any proposal or advice unless has first been routed through the 
                                                            
78 Section 10(4)(c) 
79 not only for minerals but also for  all other surveys related 
80 established under the executive agencies Act No. 30 of 1997 
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mining advisory board first. This is the higher advisory body whose advise the minister is 
not expected to disregard. 
 
The composition of the board indicates that the members are drawn from all important 
areas either affected or directly dealing with minerals. However, the law imposes no 
mandatory obligation on the minister on whether to draw members from all nine sections 
spelled out in Section 23(b). What the law says is that the minister may appoint not more 
than nine other members. That means legally (although this might be illogical) the 
minister may appoint only three members and yet the board shall be deemed to have been 
legally constituted. 
iii)  Conditions 
Part IV of the Act is very important because it is out of this part that the conditions for 
application and grants of rights are found. The part provides also the types of minerals 
which may be prospected and the right granted upon. The part is sub-divided into five 
divisions, each spelling an exclusive point for the smooth implementation of the Act. 
More  focus is on division (s.39-53) of this part for it  provides for the special mining 
license and mining license. Subject to the provisions of Section 481 , the special mining 
license means a license for large scale mining operation whose capital investment is not 
less that US $ 100,000,000 or its equivalent in Tanzanian shillings.82  
 
But this part to some extent discriminates small scale miners. Under the provision of s. 
40(1), once an application has been made for special mining license and the relevant area 
                                                            
81 Interpretation section 
82 by 2011 when writing this research the equivalency is standing at T. Shs. 160,000,000,000/= 
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covers/includes/extends to the area subject to a prospecting license issued to another 
person, the latter shall be relinquished.  
 
 Section 40(1) refers to the termination of the prospecting of a special mining license83 
within the area of his prospecting license. The law is creating confusion here as it does 
not clearly spell out who actually is entitled to the said  special mining license. That if the 
area applied for the special mining license is extending to an area covered by a 
prospecting license and the holder of the prospecting license has been terminated at the 
instance of the aspirant for special mining license, reasonably the holder of prospecting 
license, cannot be granted a special mining license on the same area. This may create 
confusion and conflict among the two prospectors. 
 
The rights that are conferred on the holder of special mining license indicate that the 
nation is wholly prepared to assist the investors for their efforts to contribute to the 
nation’s coffers. Holders of special mining license definitely may not be Tanzanians 
holding 100percent of the shares in the companies so applying. This is because raising T. 
shs 160,000,000,000/= is not easy, and is actually synonymous with daydreaming. 
Foreign applicants are thus given unfair advantage in acquiring this type of license.84 It is 
therefore a requirement of this Act that investors in this category should not be harassed 
otherwise they may quit. That is why Section 46 that is specifying the rights of holders of 
special mining license is a bit loose. The looseness was made purposely by the legislator 
so as to attract the investors. For example the section provides that the holders of the 
                                                            
83 upon application to the licencing authority 
84 although in some cases they may join hands with the Tanzanians 
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special mining license may prospect within the mining area for any mineral specified in 
the license.  
 
That is, for example, the holder applies for the mining and extraction of nickel. But on 
the license he has declared that copper may potentially be available in the mining area. 
The latter mineral to wit copper will come as a product of the first although failure to 
extract the second product area may not entitle the right holders to lose his right. The law, 
however, does not set out the modality by which this prospector should declare the time 
at which he commenced a special mining license (which obviously covers a large area) 
and therein continue to exploit other minerals, only to declare after he has already made a 
big profit out of it. To an investor, this is a loophole that benefits him and if not sealed, it 
may attract such an investor to invest in the country. 
 
The conflicting  issue is how the Act is protecting the interests of the Tanzanians living 
near and around the mines. According to Section 49(2) (e), a prospector of the mining 
license shall apply for the right not exceeding ten years. This right may be renewed for 
another ten years85  provided the holder of the right complies with the requirements as 
stipulated.  
 
There is no provision which gives the local people a voice on the determination of the 
renewal. The prospector on first application may make a firm pledge to provide various 
forms of assistance to the local people, but if he doesn’t fulfill the pledge he is not taken 
to task. What will ensue is for the right holder and the licensing authority to determine 
                                                            
85 Section 53 
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the renewal even if the local people have been least assisted. In the recommendation 
section of this research we shall propose what should be done to rectify this problem. 
iv)   Royalties 
Royalties are not defined by the law86 and therefore the section dealing with royalties’ 
leaps forward and provide for the authority and nature by which the royalty shall be paid. 
According to this section, every authorized miner shall pay to the government of the 
United Republic of Tanzania a royalty on the gross value of minerals produced under 
his/her license.87 Like in the preceding sections, a payment of royalties in this respect is a 
bit loose.  The amount of royalty is determined on the “gross” basic which according to 
the provision of Section 87(b) means the market value at the point of refining or sale.  
The percentage of royalty has been greatly lowered to attract the investors but has very 
little impact on the Tanzanians.  
 
For example, Section 87 (1) (c)  requires the right owner to pay to the government of the 
United Republic of Tanzania only 4percent of the market value of minerals at the point of 
refining or sale. This is very small royalty considering the fact that most Tanzanians are 
dependent on these minerals. The owner of the mining company is left with a lion’s share 
of 96 per cent that enables him reap super profit. This situation is tolerated  because 
Tanzanians themselves have not advanced  technologically  to the point of being able to 
exploit their own resources. They have to concede to any  proposal88 so as to make ends 
meet. 
 
                                                            
86 Act 15/10 
87 Section  87(1) 
88 although the reasonableness or S. 87(1) is highly questionable 
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 v)  Radioactive minerals  
Tanzania is ranked seventh in the world in holding uranium deposits. This is a very 
dangerous type of mineral since it possesses a high percentage of radioactive substances 
that are dangerous to human life. The Act89  gives a very little consideration to the 
exploitation of minerals rich in radioactive substances.  In order to be sure about what 
should be done while exploiting, transporting or trading  such high-risk minerals, Act No, 
15/10 has to be read together with the Atomic Energy Act Cap 188. Moreover, 
inhabitants of areas rich in radioactive deposits are not wholly protected by the law. This 
type of minerals is safe while under the soil but there are dangerous when exploited even 
if there is a  scintilla  of it in the sand from the mines. Section 108(4) provides that a 
radioactive mineral means a mineral containing by weight at least 1/20 of 1percent of 
uranium or thorium or a combination of both. According to this section, the sand carrying 
these elements is equally dangerous. Even the Atomic energy Act90  does not protect the 
vunerable citizens who circumstantially find themselves already exposed to radioactive 
substances, especially from the mines or from the leak while on transit. 
There are so many areas in the mining Act that need to be revisited despite the fact that 
the Act has greatly improved the policy. This might be the result of the “Bomani report”  
2.3 EFFECTIVENESS OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK  
2.3.1 Mining Companies Operating in Tanzania 
In this section, major mining companies that are conducting their mining business in 
Tanzania will be analysed. The focus is on major mining companies because they are the 
ones that are more affected by either the policy change or policy formulation. Again, 
                                                            
89 No. 15/10 
90 cap 188 
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considering the fact that mining business is a liberalized activity, there are so many small 
mining companies that analysing any  of them would cost enormous time, energy and 
resources. 
(a) Barrick Gold Corporation  
This company is registered in Canada and has various operations around the world. For 
Tanzania the company operates three gold mines whose first project was that of 
Bulyanhulu which is run by Barrick’s subsidiary company known as Bulyanhulu Gold 
Mine Ltd. This mining company is capable of producing 11.34 tons of gold, 7.5 tons of 
silver and 18.9 tons of copper per year. Between 2001 and 2005 the company reimbursed 
into the government royalty of  USD 15.18.  
The second mine operated by Barrick in Tanzania is North Mara situated in Tarime 
District. Barrick is running this mine through its subsidiary company North Mara Gold 
Mines Company Ltd. The mine is estimated to hold a gold deposit of almost 116.23 
tones. The third mine operated by Barrick in Tanzania is Tulawaka located in Biharamulo 
district. This mine is run in partnership with  Pangea Minerals Ltd (a subsidiary company 
of Barrick) that holds 70percent and Miners de Nord also from Canada that holds 
30percent of the shares. The mine has the capacity of producing 3.88 tons of pure gold 
per year.  
(b) Pangea Mineral Limited 
As has been disclosed above, this company is running the Tulawaka mine under the 
auspices of  Barrick Gold Corporation. The mine is estimated to hold a deposit of about 
91 tons of gold.  
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(c) Anglo Gold Ashanti Limited 
This is  the merger of two companies namely; Anglo Gold Company of South Africa and 
Ashanti Gold Field of Ghana. It operates  Geita Gold Mine that originally was owned 
rightfully by Cluff Resources PLC Ltd, a company registered in England. Subsequently, 
the rights and assets of Cluff were bought by Ashanti Gold Field registered in Ghana. In 
the year 2000, Ashanti Gold Field’s right was bought by Anglo Gold Company of South 
Africa. In the same year, AngloGold Company and Ashanti Gold Field of Ghana merged 
to form a new company know as Anglo Gold Ashanti Limited that is now running  Geita 
Gold project. 
(d) Resolute Tanzania Limited 
This is a Tanzanian company running the Gold mine located at Lusu in Nzega district. 
The company is medium sized and   its operations have been moderate since up to 2005 it 
had paid a total amounts of USD 28.09 million to the government (11.14) being  royalty 
and USD 16.95 million being other taxes. 
(e) TanzaniteOne Ltd 
This is yet another Tanzanian company. It is undertaking its mining activities in 
Simanjiro, Arusha. The project commenced with Merelani Mining Company Ltd. This is 
a subsidiary company of Africa Gem Resources (AFGEM). TanzaniteOne acquired 
everything that belonged to AFGEM in 2004 and started running the project. However, in 
the area there are also a good number of small-scale miners. 
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(f) Will Croft Company  
This is the oldest mining company in the country. It is registered in South Africa and a 
subsidiary company of De Beers Group of South Africa. It commenced its diamond 
mining in Kishapu, Shinyanga, in 1951. It is running the Mwadui diamond mine with 75 
percent of shares in partnership  with the government of Tanzania with 25 percent  of 
shares. 
(g) Xstrata Nickel  
This company is running the Kabanga Nickel mine in Kagera Region in partnership with 
Barrick Company. The operations at this site are not yet in full swing but when it comes 
into full operations it is expected that this will be the largest nickel producing mine in the 
world. 
(h) Buhemba Gold mine  
It has been preferable  to mention the mine by the name of its location rather than the 
company’s name which is located in Mara region. This company has been a source of 
controversy over the ownership of  the companies that have been exploiting the minerals 
on this site. Initially the mine was owned by Suma Jumbo JKT (a wing of the Tanzania 
People’s Defence Forces) and Tanganyika Gold Mines of Australia at an aggregate of 50 
percent  each. Later in 2003 the government of Tanzania issued a mining certificate to 
Meremeta Company Ltd which was later transpired that the government of Tanzania and 
Triennex Proprietary (Pty) Ltd of South Africa owned the gold mine at an aggregate of 
50percent of shares each.  
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The Meremeta issue raised a hot debate in the Parliament over who really owns it. 
Nevertheless, it is on record that the companies mentioned in this paragraph have at one 
time or another actively participated in mineral extraction in Tanzania. 
(i) El-Hillal Minerals Ltd:  
This is a purely Tanzania company that has a diamond mining licence for Shinyanga 
(Mwadui). Its development as compared to other foreign companies is not competitive; 
nonetheless, it is satisfactory. 
(j) NDC: This stands for the National Development Corporation, government agency 
or corporation that was established  to enhance industrial development in the country. It 
is not a mining company per se, but it is worth mentioning since it has a right over 
several areas which are rich in minerals. Under any circumstances, any company that will 
get the mining right over this area will have to first enter into agreement with NDC. 
NDC owns the Mchuchuma coal mines located in Ludewa that is estimated to have 159 
million tons of coal reserve or 377 tons of resource. Currently negotiations are under way 
to get capable international investors to run the project that has the potentiality of 
becoming a base load for other industries and producing electricity to be fed into the 
nation grid.91  
Apart from Mchuchuma, NDC also owns the right over Liganga iron ores, also located in 
Ludewa District- Njombe region. The deposits are extending over a wide area estimated 
                                                            
91 Bomani Report  at 19 
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to carry around 1218 million tons of iron ores.92 The government, however, is 
encouraging small-scale mines for the production of sponge iron believed to be deposited 
along Maliyatabu A and B and Ng’oloko hills. Implementation is yet to be executed. 
Apart from iron, the reserve is also rich in Titanium and Vanadium which are highly 
precious. 
(k) Kiwira Coal Mines Ltd.  
Again this is a purely Tanzanian company. It was established way back in 1998 under the 
Companies Act93 for the purpose of exploiting coal at Kiwira.94 It started as a complete 
subsidiary company of State Mining Company (STAMICO- holding 100percent) before 
it was privatised in 2005. At that juncture it was taken over by another Tanzanian 
company known as Tan Power Resources (70 percent) and STAMICO retained 30 
percent  of shares. Its performance has been very poor and actually is on the verge of 
collapsing. 
It is worth repeating, at this juncture, that the country is well endowed with mineral 
resources.  Articles under which  companies listed as actively engaged in minerals 
exploitation may change at any time depending on who comes in and who goes out at 
what time. 
                                                            
92 Mkelema-Maganga Matitu 98 million tons, Maganga-Luhaha 240 million tons; Magendiguruime-
Mwaselenga 160 million tons; Liganga 320 million tons and Ngongwa-Merere 400 million tons 
93 Cap 212 
94 the objective was to produce coal for industrial use (Base loard) and electricity for national grid 
consumptions 
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2.3.2 The concept of mining contracts review 
The Bomani Commission Report 
This Commission was formed on 12 November 2007 by the president of the United 
Republic of Tanzania.95 Its advent had a very long and interesting historical background 
for the whole matter was surrounded by the government’s determination to make sure 
that the mining sector contributes enormously to the nation’s economy. For this reason, 
the Mining Act was passed in Parliament in 1998.96 The 1998 Act capitalized on the 
Mining Policy 1997 which in their togetherness served at least for 9 years as the guiding 
principles for explanation, exploitation and trading of minerals in Tanzania97 
While inaugurating the Parliament of the United Republic of Tanzania in 2005, the 
president promised to form that commission for it was crystal clear that from 1997 there 
had been an increase in investment toward mining activities and the mineral production 
had gone up. However, citizens were constantly lamenting over rising inflation and the 
mining companies were equally lamenting that they were still operating at a loss and 
therefore not capable of paying the required taxes.  
There was an exigent need therefore for the government to harmonize the regime for the 
benefit of the people of Tanzania. Before the formation of the Bomani commission, the 
government had endeavoured to solve the problem by establishing various committees.98  
                                                            
95 J.K. Kikwete 
96 later to be re-enacted with substantial amendments 2010 
97 introduction to the report 
98 the Mboma committee of 2002 for solving the Mererani dispute between AFGEM and small- scale 
miners, the Kipokola committee of 2004 for reviewing of the mining policy, the Masha committee of 2006 
for analyzing the mining sectors tax system, the government negotiating team between the government, the 
Tanzania chamber of minerals and energy – TCME and  private mining  companies to see the possibility of 
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The Bomani Commission was composed of 12 members under the chairmanship of   
Justice (Rtd) Mark Bomani. Other members were five MPs, two directors from the 
ministry of constitution legal affairs and the ministry of land housing and human 
settlements, one tax consultant from Price Water House Coopers, the chairman of the 
Dar-es-Salaam stock exchange market,  a commissioner from the ministry of finance and 
a senior state attorney from the ministry of energy. The commission was required or 
rather asked to review or analyze mining contracts and other documents relevant in 
respect of big mining companies in the country, the tax regime applies in the mining 
sector, the government’s supervision scheme over major mining companies the reciprocal 
rights between an investor and the property owner of minerals, the views of the TCME on 
the end of its assignment (i.e. at the end of the three-month time frame). 
In order to accomplish its assignment, the commission visited various institutions 
associated with the mining industry in some way. These included, but not limited to, the 
ministry of minerals and energy; the Bank of Tanzania; the Tanzania Revenue Authority; 
the Tanzania Investment Centre; the State Mining Corporation; the Geological Survey 
Agency; the Mining Advisory Committee; Mining Institute; Gemstone Board; Ministry 
of Lands, Housing and Human Settlements; the National Development Corporation 
(NDC); The Civil Aviation Authority; and the Registrar of the Treasury.  
It also visited eight countries to enquire into how they operate in order to share their  
experience on how minerals are handled in those states. Four of the countries visited were 
from Africa namely South Africa, Ghana, Botswana and Zambia; two from  Asia namely 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
amending some of the mining agreements articles so as to harmonize the give and take. This team is 
popularly known as Bukuku’s committee 
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Japan and Thailand; and one country was from North America and that is Canada; and 
the last in the least was Australia. Almost all of these countries have major mining 
companies, and the commission visited their mining sites.99 
In the course of undertaking its mission, the commission discovered that the country has 
a vast deposit of minerals100 and they further discovered that  the mining sector had 
practically contributed nothing to the national economy up to 1990s101. 
 This commission realized that the government became aware of this fact and that was  
one of the factors that compelled the government  to come up with the Mining Policy of 
1997. Before the policy became operational, the government made amendments to the 
financial laws (miscellaneous amendments) Act, 1977, enacted the Mining Act 1998 and 
amended the Foreign Exchange Act 1992. All these it was found out were for the purpose 
of attracting investors so that, ultimately, the mining sector could contribute reasonably to 
the national economy. 
The commission revisited the mineral sector supervision modality. This was for the 
purpose of ascertaining whether the supervision is carried out properly and whether the 
sector was  generating enough funds for the government coffers. 
It was realized that the mining department in the parent ministry has a defined 
administrative structure but which, unfortunately, is not helpful as  the eight zone offices 
and  mining advisory boards are not of help to the ministry.  
                                                            
99 a total of twelve mines were visited 
100 a total tonnage of almost 2899 million tonnes and 50.9 million carats of diamond 
101 the few mining companies that were opened before independence and were run by the government had 
collapsed 
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On Page 23, the report notes: ‘’ the establishment indicates great weakness despite the 
fact that it was revised in 2006 (adopted by the government in 2007).” Some of the 
shortcomings that were uncovered and that would need prompt responses are: 
a) The gold audit programme is incapacitated by the insufficiency of experts almost 
in every of its major offices; lack of laboratory equipment and lack of co-ordination 
between the unit and other stakeholders such as TRA and TIC. 
b) The TANSORT (the Ministry of Energy and Minerals’ division located in 
London) has a deficit of manpower and faces high management costs (the Division was 
specifically established to sort diamond produced by Williamson Diamonds Limited that 
sells all of its produce to  de Beers of South Africa- but de Beers itself being a partner to 
the mine). 
c) The Geological survey of Tanzania (established under S.245 of the Executive 
Agency Act No. 30/97 and published in the GN No. 4/418/05) has also a deficiency of 
experts and it is not yet recognized by the international standards organization (ISO). 
It was in the view of the commission that if these problems are given due attention the 
mining sector could be improved.  
On how much does the mining sector contribute to the government coffers and improve 
the living standard of the indigenous people, the commission’s report is  breathtaking for 
national income generation. While in 2001 the country was producing 5,577,907 kgs of 
various minerals and 254,251 carats of diamond, in 2006 there was an increase up  to 
6,969,435 kgs and 272,204 carats respectively and thus fetched USD 312.2m and 856.70 
respectively.   
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It was recorded that the mining sector contributed 3.85 to the nation’s GDP and the 
royalty that was reimbursed to the government  in 2006was USD 26million, Despite all 
these achievements, the commission realized that the local people, especially those who 
are displaced to leave their places for  mining  operations were  not adequately 
compensated.  
The mining sector’s contribution to the GDP is comparatively very small and there is 
poor relationship between the giant miners and the indigenous people surrounding the 
mines (paragraph 2.14 of the report at P. 35) 
The commission met with various stakeholders, gathered their opinions on how the 
mining sector is run and the shortcomings that these stakeholders view as impending the 
mining sector development were presented and discussed. The main areas that were 
discussed are the mining company’s employees and employment in mining companies, 
people living around mines small scale miners cum mining experts. In all these areas 
(discussed on  pages 39-76 of the report) it was realized that failure to implement the 
mining policy,  failure to realize the required yield from minerals towards the GDP and 
failure to maintain good relationship between the large-scale miners and small-scale 
miners  as well as local people,  cannot reasonably be attributed to one side only. Both 
the government of the United Republic of Tanzania, large-scale mining companies, 
small-scale mines and the local people all have at one point failed to accomplish some of 
their obligations, and as consequence creating unsatisfactory environment for mining 
operations.  
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All the  countries visited have their achievements and shortcomings to the extent that no 
country may be said to have sustainable achievements. For example, the government in 
South Africa does not deal directly with investment in minerals, although it has 
established an agency that procures shares from mining companies for subsequently 
selling the same to the indigenous. The agency (Industrial Development Corporation - 
IDC) is the equivalent of Tanzania’s NDC, but their objectives are different. Since South 
Africa is prospering in the mining sector, why can’t NDC of Tanzania learn something 
from IDC? On the other hand, Australia has a different approach by which the 
government ( in Papua New Guinea) owns 5percent of the shares while mining 
companies  own 95percent of the shares at any particular mine.  
The 5percent that is the government’s due, is shared equally between the central 
government and the local government. This could be a demonstration for Tanzania where 
indigenous people are consistently crying for failure to benefit from mines around them. 
The system in Papua New Guinea (Australia) can be compared with that of Zambia 
where every foreign investor is mandatorily required to enter into partnership with the 
Zambian government  
In the most of the countries visited, minerals and the mining business is supervised either 
by the local government (Australia) or by a commission/department contributed under the 
relevant ministry. All in all, the governments are always monitoring the operations 
closely to ensure efficiency. In Botswana, for example, the president himself is the 
chairman of the mineral supervision special committee.  
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Most interestingly the Bomani commission analysed the tax system of all of the countries 
visited. The commission was more interested on how these countries adapt royalties, the 
income tax from minerals, customs duties and tax exemption on the mining sector. The 
tax imposed on mining companies varies from one country to another. Important and 
common among them all is the fact that a certain amount of royalty is left to the local 
authority around the mine for the benefit of the local people. There is no common agreed 
standard that covers every aspect of tax to harmonize the system in the visited countries. 
 For example,  while other countries charge royalty on the gross value  (of the miners), 
South Africa does not,  however, it is now considering to do so.  Canada on its part 
acknowledges the need to have royalty but the system is undertaken by the local 
government basing on the local government legislations. 
It suffices to say here that the commission realized that there is a big difference of how 
the tax regimes for the mining sector are run in those countries and the situation in 
Tanzania. It is not possible to adopt all of those systems for own use.  (Page 102 of the 
report). 
Basing on this analysis, the commission made a number of recommendations, ranging 
from the government and investors’ obligations to the relationship between the mining 
sector and electrification. Important to this research is that the commission recommended 
to  the minister responsible for minerals to enter into agreement/contract with every 
company holding a mining licence that the latter should set aside adequate funds or 
collateral for the preservation of the environment. 
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 It was also the commission’s recommendation that all mining companies be registered 
under the Dar es Salaam stock exchange market (P.124). It is the view of this researcher 
that if these recommendations are adhered to there will be a great improvement  in the 
mining sector. 
2.3.3 Conclusion.  
The Bomani Commission in Tanzania unveiled issues which had  been obscured  from 
the eyes of Tanzanians for ages. What has been discussed and observed in this chapter is 
based on the findings that were made by the Bomani Commission. Since the 
Commission’s report is based on research and has incorporated the requirements of the 
Foreign Direct Investment with international standards, it is a recommendation of this 
researcher that there is no any other viable way for the Tanzanians to benefit from their 
natural resources unless the Bomani Commission’s report is used as a guide if some  
minor  changes are made now and then depending on the prevailing situation at any given 
time in history. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
THE CONCEPT OF MINING CONTRACT REVIEW 
IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, it is intended to analyse the concept of mining contract review in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), formerly Zaire. It is called a concept in 
consideration of two main theories.  First it is a concept in the sense that the review came 
as a novel idea by which the administration of the new regime in DRC was inspired to 
control the local mining sector. But on the other hand, the review strategy is a concept in 
the sense that if successfully implemented, it might be a model for other countries to 
follow. 
For the above reasons, in this chapter, the analysis shall be made on the situation during 
the civil war in DRC when the reviews of the Commission Report on mining contract  
and the impact of the contracts were done  on the mining industry. For a better precision, 
while talking on the situation during the civil war, focus shall be put on the foreign direct 
investment policy in the DRC and coverage shall be made on some selected mining 
companies in the DRC.  
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3.2 THE SITUATION DURING THE CIVIL WAR 
The Democratic Republic of Congo is a country well-endowed with natural resources, 
especially minerals. It is estimated that the country has the largest deposits compared to 
other countries in the central African region. “By any measure, the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC) is one of the most mineral rich nations on earth.   Copper and cobalt 
alone provided  one third of the government’s revenue during Mobutu’s regime.”102 
Immediately after independence, the mining sector in the DRC was the exclusive 
contributor to the national coffers. However, the control of the sector was either in the 
hands of a small group of people or poorly managed by the State. Thus,  instead of the 
sector becoming a money-spinning source it has turned out to be a source of corruption 
by not benefiting either the country or the Congolese people.  
This situation is not only unique for  DRC;  Francis DJ in assessing the situation in Sierra 
Leone had this to say: “The 10-year-old, brutal civil war in Sierra Leone has been seen 
largely as a conflict over the country’s rich diamond resources. They have certainly 
fuelled the war but aren’t they its primary cause? Or are fundamental grievances and 
social injustice at the root of the conflict? Does the focus on diamonds have more to do 
with protecting the legitimate diamond and arms trade? ”103 
 
                                                            
102 The Carter Center. Review of DRC Mining Contracts - Update and Recommendations. November 30, 2007, 
available at www.cartercenter.org/.../drc_mining_contract accessed on 13/12/2011. 
103 David J. Francis lectures in the Department of Peace Studies at Bradford University (UK). Diamond and the Civil 
Wars in Sierra Leone. the Courier ACP-EU July-August 2001 P. 73  
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Under the presidency of Mobutu Sese Seko, the administration became more autocratic, 
eventually resulting to a civil war that lasted for five years.104 During this time,  Mobutu 
regime was doing everything within its power to get enough funds for financing wars 
against the rebels in the struggles to remain in power. The only reliable source of funds 
was the mining sector. Some scholars have attributed civil wars in some counties to the 
availability of natural resources. That the more natural resources the country has the more 
likely for it to  fall into civil wars.  
 
Commenting on this allegation, Ross M had this to say: “recent studies have found that 
natural resources and civil war are highly correlated. According to Collier and Hoeffler 
[1998, 2001], states that rely heavily on the export of primary commodities face a higher 
risk of civil war than resource-poor states. Fearon and Laitin [2002]; de Soysa [2002], 
each using unique data sets, found that oil-exporting states are more likely to suffer from 
civil wars. Fearon [2002] also shows that the presence of certain types of resources 
(gemstones and narcotics) tends to make wars last longer. Similarly, Doyle and Sambanis 
[2001] demonstrate that civil wars are harder to end when they occur in countries that 
depend on primary commodity exports. Buhaug and Gates [2002] show that the presence 
of mineral resources in a conflict zone tends to increase a conflict’s geographical 
scope.”105  
 
                                                            
104 1998-2003 inclusive 
105 Michael Ross (Assistant Professor). How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from 13 Cases 
Department of Political Science, UCLA, June 11, 2003 available at 
http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/ross/HowDoesNat3.pdf.  Accessed on 10/12/2011 
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Michael Ross is making reference to the Collier-Hoeffler’s arguments on their 
observation that “natural resources offer rebel groups unusual funding opportunities, 
because resources typically produce rents and are location-specific. If rebels try to loot or 
extort money from manufacturing firms, the firms will relocate to a safe area or be forced 
out of business; but if they extort money from resource firms, the firms cannot relocate, 
and can often make payments to rebels. States whose economies are more heavily based 
on resource exports should therefore also face a higher risk of civil wars.”106  
Driving the point home, Katshung JY107 has the following to comment: “There is a 
debate about whether the exploitation of mineral resources is a main aim for foreign 
intervention or whether mining initiatives is a way of financing the war effort. It has long 
been established that the exploitation of these resources, including ‘coltan’ (columbite-
tantalite), gold, and diamonds in the eastern Congo, and diamonds, copper, cobalt, and 
timber in central DRC, contributed to and exacerbated the conflict in the country. 
Concerned with reports of pillaging of resources by the foreign forces, the UN Security 
Council mandated an independent panel to investigate these allegations. In fact, in its 
presidential statement dated 2 June 2000 (S/PRST/2000/20), the Security Council 
requested that the Secretary-General establish a Panel of Experts on the illegal 
exploitation of natural resources and other forms of wealth of the DRC.”108 
  
                                                            
106 Michael Ross, How do Natural Resources Influence Civil War. At 3. 
107 Dr Joseph Yav Katshung is a lecturer in the Faculty of Law at the University of Lubumbashi, an advocate at 
Lubumbashi Bar Association and the coordinator of the UNESCO Chair for Human Rights, Democracy, Good 
Governance, Conflict Resolution and Peace at the University of Lubumbashi, DRC 
108 Dr Joseph Yav Katshung Greasing the wheels of reconciliation in the Great Lakes region. African Security 
Review 16.3 Institute for Security Studies. P. 119 
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It is most obvious that minerals were hunted not only by the government of Mobutu but 
also the insurgents (some of whom had already penetrated the government) who were 
also much depending on the minerals as the source of their funding for the civil wars. 
This is the scenario that prevailed in the years between 1998 and 2003 during which 61 
mining contracts were signed.109 The environment surrounding the signing of these 
contracts did not avail them an opportunity to be transparent. Rather, the whole process 
was beleaguered by corruption. Most of the people in the DRC itself and even beyond its 
borders were of the firm belief that the national riches had been exchanged for war spoils 
and political favours 
 
After scavenging the country for almost 35 years, Mobutu was toppled by Laurent 
Kabila. Kabila had systematically constructed civil-cum-guerrilla war strategies by which 
for several years he was leading the insurgents especially in the eastern part of the 
country against Mobutu. It was under this move that in 1996 Kabila as a leader of rebel 
movement in the eastern Zaire110 handed several rich mining concessions to foreign 
companies.111 These mineral business deals enabled Kabila to get enough money to fund 
his anti-Mobutu war, and to  eventually topple the despotic  president. But following this 
change of government, the situation in the country was not peaceful. There were some 
remnants of army personnel who were still loyal to Mobutu who maintained operations 
against the Kabila government. The United Nations was circumstantially forced to send 
in “peace keeping troops.” However, it is alleged that some of the peace keeping troops 
                                                            
109 The five years of civil wars against the administration of Mobutu Seseseko did not end with the downfall of 
Mobutu but rather the insurgents continued to roam around although now not against Mobutu but against his 
successors (the two Kabila(s). 
110 Present day DRC 
111 Jean-Luc Mukeminalumbu. D.R Congo mining Contracts Review: A New change of Growth. Kinshasa 2nd April 
2007 
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indulged themselves in mineral deals for their own benefits. Thus, the United Nations 
report and International NGO’s reports accused foreign armies of perpetuating the wars 
so they could continue exploiting Congo's reserves.112 
At this time, neighbouring Rwanda and Uganda were naturally attracted into the DRC 
conflicts for one reason that some of the insurgents in these two countries had made the 
DRC forests their homes and base from where they attacked their own countries. The 
home governments were aggrieved and wanted to contain these dissidents inside the DRC 
boundaries. In fulfilling their objectives, the Rwanda and Uganda governments decided 
to support the revolts in DRC. With this external support, the civil wars intensified in 
DRC and it was systematically becoming evident that it was beyond the government’s 
control. There was nothing more the Kabila government could have done other than 
looking outside also for assistance. Zimbabwe and Namibia very quickly came to the 
assistance of DRC but of course on some considerations. Mr. Kabila and his government 
then signed some business deals with allies Zimbabwe and Namibia whereof these 
countries were assured of some mineral resources in turn for their military support. 
Eventually the Kabila’s government was controlling the whole of DRC. One of the costs 
for bringing this government into power was the signing of several mining contracts.113 
Of course it is not a bad thing to sign such contracts because any country aspiring for 
development could have done so. The only bad thing on these contracts is that they were 
(and still are) extremely unfavourable for the DRC. Since mining has been the backbone 
of the Congolese economy since colonial times, those contracts concerned the vital 
                                                            
112 Jean-Luc Mukeminalumbu D.R Congo mining contract review 
113 It is believed that about 61 mining contracts were signed during this time 
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mining resources in the DRC entailing obligations for the coming decades. Although the 
contracts were deemed to have been entered for the interests of the public, but the 
negotiations and approval of those contracts took place with a total absence of 
transparency. In some of the contracts, the time and place of signing and the underlying 
terms remains to be a national maze. 
During the whole time of civil wars, the mining sector remained almost unattended and it 
was left to benefit  only a handful of people instead of benefiting the whole nation. The 
Carter Centre in its document titled Review of DRC Mining Contracts114 was of the view 
that hundreds of millions of dollars were spent to help bring an end to war in Congo. It 
further observed that all those who were assisting in bringing about the end of civil wars 
left the irregularities in the mining sector unattended. The non-attendance to this sector 
was attributed to many reasons,  two important among them being that:- (a) firstly, 
paying attention to the mining sector could have destabilized the move towards fair 
election that was in full swing; (b) secondly, it was argued that international donor 
countries stopped pressing for reform when the investment climate began to improve in 
late 2004. In the face of corruption allegations and human rights abuses, these countries 
have made only cautious criticisms115.  
 
The availability of minerals fuelled the civil wars in the DRC to persist for a long time. 
This is according to the theory that was developed by Michael Ross that natural resources  
may prolong the duration of civil war, independent of its effects on the incidence of civil 
war… resource wealth can lengthen a conflict if it enables the rebels to fund themselves, 
                                                            
114 The Carter Center. Review of DRC Mining Contracts - Update and Recommendations 
115  The Carter Center at 1 quoting the view of the International Crisis Group (ICG) 
 
 
 
 
 63 
 
and hence continue fighting instead of being crushed or forced to the negotiating table.” 
116 Most of Ross’ inputs in this argument are found in the reports of Global Witness, a 
London-based NGO.117  
But it is also argued that some of the soldiers, especially the commanders, may fuel the 
civil wars to prolong for a long time in as long as they are benefiting from the 
exploitation of minerals. This fact does not apply to the dissidents only but also to 
government officers and peace keeping missions.118 While quoting several sources, Ross 
on this point has the following suggestion: “resource wealth discourages peace 
settlements, if wartime looting is sufficiently profitable for either soldiers or their 
commanding officers. Sherman [2000: 699], for example, suggests that rebel groups in 
Angola, Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and elsewhere enrich 
themselves through the sale or exchange of diamonds…economic interests not only shape 
the conflict but also perpetuate it  if the economic advantage of fighting outweighs that of 
peace.”119  
The presence of the United Nations Organization’s Peace keeping mission in DRC 
brought hopes that may be the civil wars would end soon letting the minerals of DRC to 
benefit the indigenous. However, despite all these hopeful developments, Congolese are 
still living in fear. According to John Katunga, the mineral rich regions in the eastern 
DRC are still plagued by violence and insecurity.120 A clear analysis of the matter reveals 
                                                            
116  Ross  Michael, How do Natural Resources Influence Civil War at  13. 
117 Available at www.globalwitness.org accessed on 10/12/2011. 
118 In 2009-2010 Indian soldiers listed in the United Nations 
Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC) were accused of enriching themselves with Congolese minerals 
119 Ross  Michael, How do Natural Resources Influence Civil War at   13. 
120 Katunga John. Report from Africa. Population, Health, Environment, and Conflict: Minerals, Forests, and 
Violent Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. ECSP Report. Issue 12. P. 15, available at 
http://zunia.org/uploads/media/knowledge/ReportFromAfrica1210.pdf accessed on 29/8/2011. 
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that the prevalence of violence is highest in areas considered to be rich in coltan and 
cassiterite (the Kivu provinces), gold (Kivu provinces and Province Orientale), and 
diamonds (Province Orientale). This has been the main reason behind the fighting that 
continues around key mining towns in North Kivu between pro-Rwandan groups, the 
national army, and militias; and in South Kivu, national army soldiers and Rwandan Hutu 
rebels seek to control mines and their revenues. According to John Katunga, foreign 
rebels and militia groups (mainly from neighbouring Rwanda and Burundi) still operating 
in eastern DRC remain motivated by the money  gained from exploiting minerals and 
other natural resources.121 
3.2.1 Foreign Direct Investment Policy in DRC 
 
As has been argued above, DRC is highly endowed with mineral resources. For a long 
time the country has been a target of foreign investors not for the purpose of aiding 
development for the benefit of the Congolese but rather for acquiring resources. On this 
point Francis DJ  had  the view that the wars in former Zaire and Angola in the 1960s 
and 1970s were about the domestic and international exploitation of strategic minerals. 
But the role played by these minerals – especially diamonds, oil, uranium, cobalt, gold 
and copper – in fuelling conflicts was veiled during the Cold War because of the focus on 
East-West ideological conflict. But the rivalry between superpowers  in countries such as 
Angola and Zaire was not only about ideology and shaping post-colonial African 
diplomacy. At its heart was control over strategic resources.122 
                                                            
121Katunga John. 
122David J. Francis lectures in the Department of Peace Studies at Bradford University (UK). Diamond and the Civil 
Wars in Sierra Leone. at. 73-74 
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The DRC has fallen victim of “conflict diamonds.” This scenario that is most common in 
mineral-rich African countries describes the diamonds that originate from territories 
controlled by rebel forces fighting to overthrow a legitimate and internationally 
recognised government. In fact for DRC (and some other African countries) now the 
issue is not diamond but rather all types of minerals. Of recent, some analysts have 
preferred to expand the definition of this scenario of conflict diamonds to include 
minerals that originate in areas controlled by government forces trading in illegal 
minerals/diamonds.  
On the face of records, diamonds plays a major role by fuelling wars in Africa by way of 
illegal diamond trade. According to Francis DJ, this is a role played by the rather unusual 
criminal networks (forged between rebel factions, warlords, corrupt politicians and so 
forth). Some people also use the terms ‘blood diamonds’ and ‘war diamonds’ to describe 
their role in funding wars and conflicts.123 Mineral proceeds (akin to conflict diamonds) 
as the currency of war have generated huge personal fortunes for warlords, rebel 
movements and their regional and international clients. It was estimated that in the DRC 
by 1999 approximately $35 million worth of diamonds were produced in rebel-held 
territories.124 The bad thing is that the proceeds from the sale of conflict diamonds have 
been mainly used to buy weapons. 
That is the position that existed in the late 1990’s. Laurent Kabila thought of rectifying 
the situation before he stepped into power. Thus in 1996 he handed several rich mining 
concessions to foreign companies thinking that the wealth was being plundered by 
                                                            
123 Francis David J. at 73 
124 Francis David J. at 74 
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Mobutu’s government. What ensued is that during the years of war and transition, 
numerous mining contracts have been signed that are extremely unfavourable for the 
DRC. Those contracts concern the vital mining resources in the country and entail 
obligations for the coming decades. The negotiations and approval of those contracts took 
place with a total absence of transparency. Because the contents of those contracts remain 
unknown to the Congolese people, the DRC endeavoured to review the mining contracts 
with an objective of making all contracts benefit the entire population of DRC. 
The country therefore established a commission to review at least 60 mining contracts 
signed before and during the civil wars. The review was not unexpected as it is believed 
that problems in the contracts were identified by NGOs, the World Bank, a parliamentary 
commission of the DRC, and professional consultants paid by the Bank.125 For this 
reason since March 2007 all negotiations on mining contracts were suspended until the 
commission has finished its work. The movement (of establishment of a Mining Review 
Commission) is highly appreciated since the mining contract review is  vital to the 
development of the DRC.126 Implementation of the review programme was in full support 
of the government. According to the Carter Centre report, in February 2007, following 
the first elections in decades, a new government was installed in the DRC under President 
Joseph Kabila and Prime Minister Antoine Gizenga. This government immediately issued 
a “Governance Contract,” laying out its priorities and commitments in which 
transparency in the mining sector and renegotiation, if necessary, of existing agreements 
were given first priority. The World Bank and European Commission directly entered 
                                                            
125The Carter Center. Review of DRC Mining Contracts - Update and Recommendations November 30, 2007. 
At  2 
126 Jean-Luc Mukeminalumbu (MBM-Conseil). D.R Congo Mining Contracts Review: A New Chance of Growth 
Kinshasa, 2nd April 2007 at  2. 
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into the deal by drafting the text of the Governance Contract, which was intended to 
translate the goals outlined in the Bank’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy Paper 
into action strategies.127 
It is not easy to make a prompt assessment whether the objectives of the Commission 
were met. However, among other things, it was supposed to elucidate all mining contracts 
inherited from the past regimes, and where such contracts or any one of them would be 
seen to be engulfed in an obscured environment, then to revise it/them with a view of 
restructuring it/them by either renegotiating, revoking or cancelling them. This could not 
be done, however, without setting up an independent mechanism to monitor the 
implementation of these and future mining contracts. The success or failure of the 
commission was hooked on the nature of its operations. As a matter of ethical 
considerations, the Commission was supposed to be transparent and reliable all along the 
review, by publishing all the contracts and different steps of the review and involving as 
many civil societies as possible in the review work so as to eliminate all possible chances 
of suspicions and untrustworthiness.128  
The government’s support to the establishment of the Commission did not come from the 
air. There were significant reasons to support the Commission on the basis that most 
problems in the contracts were well documented. The documentation was based on the 
studies that had been conducted under several initiatives. Three among these were a 
project backed up by the World Bank,129 the Duncan & Allen review,130 and audits by 
                                                            
127 The Carter Center Review of DRC Mining Contracts. At  2 
128 Jean-Luc Mukeminalumbu  At 3 
129 The Lutundula Report done in 2005 under the Parliamentary Commission  
130 undertaken by a US law firm April 2006 
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Ernst & Young.131 The common factor among all these reports is that they all detailed 
serious failings in the agreements or their implementation. The substantiation of the 
foregoing is not to the 100 percent  mark since the Duncan & Allen review and the Ernst 
& Young audits remained secret after completion. However, this deficit is complemented 
by reports from some NGOs and a leaked memo from one of the principal World Bank 
mining officers noting similar concerns with the contracts.132 
Since  the environments in the mining sites were greatly damaged, the DRC  
administration under Joseph Kabila determined to restructure the mining sector  so as to 
make it environmental friendly. It was difficult for the DRC government to stand alone 
and execute this task. A foreign assistance was absolute. The government then 
collaborated with the World Bank Group and USAID to rebuild institutions that will 
guarantee effective management of the mining and forest sectors. The institutions were 
required (still required a today) to conform to the existing international frameworks and 
also making sure that environmental issues are given top priority.133  
Almost all of the companies that engaged in mineral exploitation were foreign. This 
necessitated the need of making arrangements that could compel the mining companies to 
take into consideration the needs and aspirations of the communities living around these 
resources via a participatory decision-making process.134 The good result of this was that 
the government of Kinshasa developed a Mining Code135 something that further 
                                                            
131 April 2006 
132 The Carter Center. Review of DRC Mining Contracts. At  3 
133 Katunga John  at  17 
134 Katunga John  at  17 
135 With the support of the World Bank Group 
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motivated more international investors.136 The high demand of minerals the world over, 
taken together with the existence of the mining codes have been a new attraction for 
foreign investors to rethink on coming back to DRC. A good example may be taken of 
the World Bank that committed USD1.83 billion in loans and grants from 2001-2005 to 
encourage stability and provide capacity for the government to provide basic services.137  
The government, however, did not enjoy a smooth ride over these initiatives. The Mining 
code for example, is apparently favouring private investors. This can be impliedly 
adduced from the World Bank’s approach to restructuring the bankrupt Gécamines, most 
of whose assets were hurriedly sold to private investors.138 But sometimes the World 
Bank has been criticized as not being a good ally to DRC but a short cut response 
according to Global Witness is that the government’s interference and delays in the 
restructuring program have undercut implementation of World Bank programs. As the 
World Bank is a heavy financier for developing countries, that was a blow to DRC and 
some analysts think that it may further discourage foreign investors. 
Within the government itself representatives recognize that the Mining Code was  a good 
attempt to harmonize laws regulating the mining sector and end the prevailing chaos. 
This firm belief is challenged  by the facts that the implementation of the plan faces 
strong opposition  created in part by the Mining Ministry lacking  capacity for follow-up; 
loopholes regarding artisanal miners, especially the identification and allocation of 
concessions. In 2006 Global Witness reported that international investors are ignoring the 
conditions of the Mining Code for the export of raw minerals, leading to huge loss of 
                                                            
136 The Mining Code is available online (in English) at  http://www.miningcongo.cd/codeminier/codeminier_eng.pdf  
accessed on 20/12/2011. 
137 Katunga John at 17. 
138  Global Witness, (2006). 35 in Katunga John 17. 
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returns for the government. Any scintilla of truth in this allegation will make foreign 
investment in the sense of fuelling development to lose its real meaning. 
Because there is still a very long way to go and the people of DRC would appreciate any 
kind assistance focusing on their development, the government has widely opened its 
doors various international bodies, as well as the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), to continue to support the Mining Codes. The World Bank and the 
IMF should refocus capacity-building efforts in the mineral sector at the national 
(ministerial) and local levels, and encourage the creation of a special parliamentary 
commission on mines. 
3.2.2 Selected Mining Companies in DRC 
 
In the DRC, mining companies are potentially most significant development partners. 
Most of them were operating in the country before the commencement of the civil wars 
and furthermore, many are lauded for their respect for the contract review process. 
During this process, most of them were willing to engage on the merits of their contracts 
with both the Revisitation Commission and civil society.139 
As has been said above, the DRC is highly gifted and endowed with mineral resources. 
Major exploitation of these minerals started way back in the 1960s when Zaire (present 
time DRC) was the leading producer of copper and cobalt. According to Kevin PCJ 
D’Souza, gold was first discovered in north eastern DRC in 1903 and a number of mining 
companies entered the region to exploit its resources.  
                                                            
139The Carter Center Review of DRC Mining Contracts - Update and Recommendations November 30, 2007. P.12 
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Following independence in 1960, the state nationalised many existing companies 
including the Belgian company Société des Mines d’Or de Kilo – Moto (SOKIMO) 
which became the Office des Mines d’Or de Kilo-Moto (OKIMO)140 From the 
beginning, exploitation was done under concessions most of which were owned by state 
mining parastatals. For example, copper concessions were formerly managed by 
Gécamines. 141 However, in the 1990’s following the intensification of civil wars, most 
of the parastatals began to crumble although they were transferring their shares to other 
companies.142 It is of no use therefore to deliberate on the companies that were exploiting 
minerals in DRC. Examination of the current companies will be more relevant to this 
study. 
Currently in the DRC, mineral exploitation is done under three major modes. The first 
one is large scale mining (LSM) mainly operated by big mining companies (especially 
multinational companies). The second is the Artisanal and Small-scale Mining (ASM) 
that is employing a multitude of people and spread all over the country. The last one is 
informal and unofficial involvement of the military and local authorities in the illegal 
mineral trade.143 But the fact remains that a greater percentage of the minerals escapes the 
nation’s screens unnoticed. According to Kevin PCJ D’Souza there is a general 
consensus from most agencies that around 60 per cent of mineral produce passes through 
                                                            
140 Kevin PCJ D’Souza. Artisanal Mining in the DRC (Key Issues, Challenges and Opportunities). WARDELL 
ARMSTRONG LLP (a collaborative effort between the World Bank’s OGMC Group, DFID's Policy Division, 
Sustainable Development Group, DFID's DRC office, and the World Bank hosted Communities and Small scale 
Mining (CASM) initiative) August 2007 (Version 1.3). P. 3 
 
141 Générale des Carriers et des Mines, the state owned Parastatal Mining Company 
142 Gécamines transferred its shares to SOFRECO but the transfer did not improve production in the mines formerly 
owned by Gécamines. While the production is going down the external debts of the companies are increasing. 
143 Both in trafficking and seeking 
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illegal channels, through Kasumbalesa on the Zambian border (with small amounts 
passing westwards via Lake Moero).144  
After independence through to 1995 mineral rights in the DRC could only be held by the 
government through State owned companies. The leading companies in this operation 
were Gécamines, MIBA, Sominki, and Okimo. Following the inability to manage during  
civil wars, it was apparent that the companies145 were now crumbling to the ground. In 
1994/95, in face of the inability of the state companies to maintain production, the 
government boldly decided to allow the companies to enter into partnerships with private 
companies. This implied that the mineral rights were now to be vested in the partnership. 
Among other things the partnerships were to specify the investments, internal 
management of the partnership as well as the modalities of exploration, development, 
mining and commercialization.146  
Currently, there are four key mining areas in the DRC as follows: (1) The Orientale & 
Équateur located in the extreme north eastern corner of DRC. In this area the major 
minerals that are found are Gold & Diamonds. The activity is employing 60-150,000 and 
100,000 for gold and diamond as ASM respectively. Big companies engaged in mining 
activities in this area are: OKIMO (Office des Mines d'Or de Kilo Moto), AngloGold 
Ashanti, Moto Gold Mines, Mwana Africa, Barrick, Tangold, Greendale Universal, 
Borgakim Mining, Kibali Gold, Blue Rose, Amani Gold, velaphanda Holdings and Afri 
Minerals. (2) The Kivu (North and South) & Maniema that is rich in Cassiterite, Coltan 
                                                            
144 Kevin PCJ D’Souza.   
145 State owned companies 
146 The World Bank  Democratic Republic of Congo Growth with Governance in the Mining Sector Document  
Report No. 43402-ZR of May 2008 P. 132 
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& Gold. The activity is employing150,000 in Southern Kivu, 200,000 in Northen Kivu 
and 50,000 in Maniema area as ASMs. Big companies engaged in mining activities in 
this area are Banro Corporation, Metal Processing Congo and Groupe Minier Bagandula. 
(3) The Kasaï (Occidental & Oriental) mining area that is rich in Diamonds. More than 
one million miners are engaged in this area as ASMs. Big companies engaged in 
exploitation activities in this area are MIBA (Minière de Bakwanga) & First African 
Diamonds Ltd., De Beers, Oryx Natural Resources (Sengamines/Emikor), BHP Billiton, 
Mwana Africa, Rio Tinto, SouthernEra, Gravity Diamonds, Alrosa, Pangea 
DiamondFields, Affinor Resources, BRC Diamond Corp and Midamines. (4) The last and 
biggest mining area in the country is Katanga. The area is rich in Copper & Cobalt, Gold, 
Uranium and Manganese. Around 150,000 miners are engaged as ASMs. For copper and 
cobalt, the big companies engaged are Gécamines (Générale des Carrières et des Mines) 
Anvil Mining, Kingamyambo Musonoi Tailings (KMT), First Quantum Minerals, 
Katanga Mining, Tenke Mining (Freeport McMoRan/Lundin Group), Nikanor /DCP 
(KOV), Global Enterprises Corp, International Panaroma Resources, Metrorex, Kumba 
Resources, Kababankola Mining (KMC), Central African Mining & Exploration 
(CAMEC), Copper Resources Corp (MMK), Platmin Congo, Costamin, Congo Star 
Resources, Africo Resources, Orgaman, Tiger Resources, Teal Exploration & Mining, 
Melikor Resources, Kakanda Development Corp/PTM Minerals, George Forrest Int / 
Outukumpu (STL), Sodimco,Feza Mining, Casmin, Colec Group, Rubicon Minerals and 
China Sun Group HiTech. Gold Fields and Cluff Miningis engaged in Gold mining, 
Brinkley Mining in Uranium and Maganense in the area is exploited by Enterprise 
Minière de Kisenge-Manganese.147   
                                                            
147 Kevin PCJ D’Souza, at. 2 
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Greenock Resources Inc. 
This is a Canadian-based mineral development company focused on early- to mid-stage 
properties that have high potential for near-term production. The company’s main 
operation area in the DRC is in Kakanda (copper/cobalt). Greenock Resources Inc. 
(“Greenock” or the “Company”) is focused primarily on: (1) its Kakanda copper/cobalt 
project (51percent to 70 percent interest subject to final joint venture terms and payment 
“pas du porte” concession payment) and the other 30percent to 49percent held by 
Gécamines, the state-owned mining company. 
 
The Company has indulged itself in a major investment under which it is reprocessing the 
Kakanda tailings and developing associated Kakanda hard rock deposits as an economic 
project of sufficient scale to attract major investors.148 According to the Greenock 
Resources Inc. this project (the Kakanda project) has NI 43-101 Measured and Indicated 
Resources of 18.5 million tonnes with an average grade of 1.25percent copper and 
0.15percent cobalt. The adjacent hard rock deposits have a historical resource of 18.6 
million tonnes with an average grade of 3.19percent copper and 0.19percent cobalt.149 
Greenock Resources Inc along with 60 other mining companies in December 2009, they 
received approval from the DRC government confirming their legitimate contractual 
claims on Kakanda. Consistent operation in the area has been fuelled by the recent rise in 
                                                            
148The World Bank. Democratic Republic of Congo Growth with Governance in the Mining Sector  Document  
Report No. 43402-ZR of May 2008 P. 132  
 
149 Greenock Resources INC Update Report  January 11, 2011 P.2 (available at eResearch Corporation 
www.eresearch.ca) 
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copper prices combined with improved capital markets that is now attracting growing 
interest by competitors in the area.150 
 
Beginning in 2007, Greenock invented a modality of engaging into the minerals 
exploitation in the DRC by which a strategic joint venture was formed between 
Gécamines (La Générale des Carrières et des Mines, which is a state-owned mining 
company in the Democratic Republic of Congo) and PTM Minerals (Cayman) Ltd. The 
objective was to develop the Kakanda project.151 Subsequently in December 2008, 
Gécamines and PTM signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to establish a joint 
venture in the name of “Kakanda Mining Development” to explore the Kakanda tailing 
deposits. By this memorandum Greenock was mandated to be a major shareholder with 
up to a 70percent interest.152 This strategic joint venture is a positive development in 
reducing project risk and improving project financing. The Company is also looking for 
other strategic partners to finance the Kakanda project.153  
Gécamines154  
This is a state owned parastatal mining company. From the 1960’s it was the sole state 
owning parastatal mining company for copper although its facilities have been 
deteriorating with time. This resulted to the stagnation of production in Katanga with 
total capacity utilization estimated at less than 10percent, and an alleged external debt of 
                                                            
150 According to Greenock Resources INC  Update Report January  The price of copper increased significantly over 
the last 10 years, moving from under US$1.00 per lb to as high as US$4.00 per lb before the global economic 
slowdown that began in summer 2008. Although the price subsequently retreated to under US$1.50 per lb in late 
2008, it rose sharply through 2009 and 2010 and is now trading at US$4.35/lb (close of January 11, 2011). Global 
demand is strong, with China leading the way, and supply is constrained. 
151 PTM is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Greenock 
152 currently the Company holds 51 per cent . 
153 Greenock Resources INC. Update Report. P. 4 
154 Générale des Carriers et des Mines. To date Gécamines’s facilities are managed by SOFRECO 
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USD2.5 billion.155 At a certain point the World Bank disengaged itself from the mining 
activities in Zaire.156 The World Bank reinitiated involvement with the DRC at Joseph 
Kabila’s request in early 2001. Reforming the mining sector and the most significant 
state-owned mining company, Gécamines, were high on the World Bank’s list of 
immediate reforms for the Congo. The World Bank was the leading force in drafting the 
new mining code adopted in 2002. The Code was written to attract foreign private 
investment and bring some degree of uniformity to the mining industry.157 
In 2005 Gécamines concluded a controversial contract with a major American company 
Phelps Dodge158 that holds rights to the world’s largest untapped copper reserves, Tenke 
Fungurume. The contract was highly criticized out of its obscurity. Phelps Dodge (now 
owned by Freeport McMoRan) remains the only company involved in the contract review 
at this time. However, it holds rights to the world’s largest untapped copper reserves, 
Tenke Fungurume. The contract for Tenke Fungurume was strongly criticized at the time 
it was concluded in 2005, in part because the circumstances for such a major agreement 
were inconsistent with the internationally agreed efforts to reform the copper-cobalt 
parastatal, Gécamines. The World Bank engaged a consulting company to assist in 
restructuring Gécamines. The consultant insisted on a suspension until existing contracts 
could be reviewed. At that juncture the law firm of Duncan & Allen was contracted for 
the review on that basis. The firm raised serious questions about, among other things, the 
validity of the rights to Tenke Fungurume that were the subject of the contract with 
Phelps Dodge. 
                                                            
155 Kevin PCJ D’Souza.  
156 Present time DRC 
157 The Carter Center Review of DRC Mining Contracts.  
158 Currently owned by Freeport McMoRan 
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To everyone, Gécamines meant DRC and DRC represented Gécamines. For this reason, 
the World Bank pressurized its consultants to work gallantly and really they were active 
in many areas of the Congo’s mining industry, particularly the privatization of mining in 
Katanga159 and restructuring the country’s giant copper-cobalt parastatal Gécamines. Two 
firms were hired to perform two different things to wit: the UK-based firm of IMC was 
retained to write a report detailing possible reforms for Gécamines. At the same time, the 
Washington-based law firm, Duncan & Allen, with a long history of involvement in DRC 
mining, was hired to assist in reviewing Gécamines’ contracts. Under this restructuring, 
the World Bank program remained responsible for hiring and paying the new Director of 
Gécamines. 
But all these efforts did not give absolute relief to Gécamines. The unofficial message 
transmitted to The World Bank’s DRC Country Director, expressed very serious concerns 
about new contracts that had been concluded by Gécamines; especially with three major 
contracts: that is: the Kinross Forrest contract, Global Enterprises Corporate contract, and 
Lundin and Phelps Dodge contracts. Generally it was revealed that the contracts removed 
“75percent of the productive base” of Gécamines. On the face of every contract 
mentioned above it was clear that they were full up of problems. It was the view of the 
consultants that allowing such contracts to operate would imply incapacitating 
development. There is no record of the World Bank having taken any action in relation to 
these contracts entered between Gécamines and other companies as listed above. In fact 
                                                            
159 This is the location of the country’s vast copper and cobalt reserves 
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these contracts remain in effect today and are among those being reviewed by the 
Revisitation Commission.160 
Katanga Mining Limited161 
The company has been working on the restructuring mode from one stage to another 
since July 8, 2004. The company has its registered and head offices located Canon's 
Court, 22 Victoria Street, Hamilton, HM EX and Bermuda. 
In 2008 the number of directors was increased to ten while permitting the corporation to 
enter into agreements with the holders of Common Shares relating to the appointment of 
directors who have since then been terminated by mutual agreement.162 In early January 
2009 the authorized share capital of the corporation was further increased to consist of 
1,000 Common Shares with a par value of $12.00 each and 5,000,000,000 Common 
Shares with  value of $0.10 each. Subsequently this was removed by the amendment of 
the bye-laws in May 2010. In its day to day operations, the company has entered into 
inter-corporate relationships with other subsidiaries under which several joint ventures 
are undertaken. For example, the "Kamoto Joint Venture" was formed in 2004 for the 
purpose of holding, redeveloping, rehabilitating and operating certain exploration and 
mining properties.163 Another outstanding venture that was formed is known as DCP 
                                                            
160 The Carter Center Review of DRC Mining Contracts - Update and Recommendations. (November 30, 2007)  12 
161 The Corporation was incorporated under the Laws of Bermuda on October 7, 1996 as New Inca Gold Ltd. On 
July 8, 2004, the Corporation consolidated its common shares on a ten-for-one basis and changed its name to 
Balloch Resources Ltd. On November 30, 2005 the Corporation changed its name to Katanga Mining Limited. On 
November 2, 2007 
162 This can be inferred from the General Developments in the Business of Katanga–2009 Developments –
Termination of Relationship Agreements available at  http://www.katangamining.com/kat/investor_relations/annual-
info-forms/aif-2011/aif-2011.pdf  accessed on 26/12/2011. 
 
163 The agreement was between KFL Limited ("KFL") and La Générale des Carrières et des Mines ("Gécamines") 
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Joint Venture164entered between Global Enterprises Corporation Limited ("GEC") and 
Gécamines on September 9, 2004 ("DCP Joint Venture Assets"). Later GEC and 
Gécamines incorporated and organized a company in the DRC known as DRC Copper 
and Cobalt sarl ("DCP") to hold the DCP Joint Venture Assets. DCP was owned 
75percent by GEC and 25percent by Gécamines. Katanga acquired a 100percent interest 
in GEC as part of the acquisition of Nikanor PLC ("Nikanor") in January of 2008.   
 
In April 2007 the DRC government formed the Commission of inquiry to review 
approximately 60 mining agreements entered into by parastatal companies of the 
Congolese government. The KCC Joint Venture Agreement and the DCP Joint Venture 
Agreement were among the mining agreements to be reviewed. The Commission’s report 
strongly opposed the partnership between Gécamines and the other companies.165 
Towards the last quarter of 2008 the DRC Ministry of Mines issued terms of reference 
for the renegotiation and/or termination of the mining contracts entered into by KCC and 
DCP. This resulted into another agreement of July 2009 under which Gécamines, KFL 
and GEC, in the presence of KCC, DCP, La Société Immobilière du Congo ("SIMCO"), 
Katanga Mining Holdings Limited, Katanga Mining Finance Limited and KML (BVI) 
Holdco Ltd. entered into an agreement (the “Amended Kamoto JV Agreement”). This 
agreement resulted in the termination of the KCC Joint Venture Agreement and DCP 
Joint Venture Agreement.  
 
                                                            
164 This is a joint venture that was formed in order to extract and transform copper, cobalt and associated mineral 
substances in an area close to the Kamoto Joint Venture Assets, namely the deposits of KOV, Kananga and 
Tilwezembe. ("DCP Joint Venture Assets") pursuant to a joint venture agreement dated September 9, 2004 between 
Global Enterprises Corporation Limited ("GEC") and Gécamines 
165 This was before Katanga Company acquired Nikanor 
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In late  2007, Katanga Mining Company announced that it had reached an agreement 
with the board of directors of Nikanor on the terms of a recommended merger of the two 
companies mandating Katanga to become the owner (directly or indirectly) of a number 
of companies. Pursuant to this agreement, Katanga became the indirect owner of GEC, 
which was the owner of 75 percent of DCP. 
 
The Merger was implemented by way of a take-over bid for Nikanor shares on the basis 
of 0.613 Common Shares of Katanga and $2.16 in cash (by way of a cash return by 
Nikanor) for each Nikanor share held. It was commonly agreed that Katanga issue and 
deliver 127,168,221 Common Shares from treasury (i) as consideration for the Nikanor 
shares tendered to the offer and (ii) for certain convertible securities of Nikanor 
outstanding prior to the Merger.166 
 
On February 8, 2008, Katanga announced to enter into an agreement between KFL, 
Gécamines and KCC providing that, in exchange for certain compensation, security and 
payment, the portion of the concessions held by KCC representing the Mashamba West 
and Dikulwe deposits would be released to Gécamines.167  
 
Under this agreement, Gécamines was required to replace these deposits by July 1, 2015 
with other deposits having a total tonnage of 3,992,185 tons of copper and 205,629 tons 
of cobalt according to international standards. The parties have agreed to fix the 
                                                            
166 Available at www.sedar.com accessed on 11/12/2011. 
167 These deposits which were included in the June 23, 2006 amended technical report of Katanga and were not 
scheduled to start producing oxide ores until 2020 and 2023, respectively. 
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equivalent value of the deposits released at $285 million, payable on July 1, 2015. The 
parties will calculate the proportion of the reserves replaced by Gécamines on July 1, 
2015. In the event that there shall be detected any kind of shortfall, the shortfall shall be 
calculated and the financial compensation shall be payable as the shortfall percentage 
multiplied by $285 million. Any remaining payments were due to be paid from 
Gécamines' future revenues (being dividends and royalties due from July 1, 2015) 
received from the Merged JV Company until completion of full payment. 
 
In early 2008 the DRC government wanted the Katanga Mining Company to discuss with 
it certain issues on its mining activities. The discussion would dwell on: (i) the 
submission of feasibility studies by KCC and DCP; (ii) Gécamines' role in the 
management of the Kamoto Joint Venture and the DCP Joint Venture; (iii) the 
submission of schedules of achievements for social projects; and, (iv)  re-examination of 
royalty payments for lease facilities. The discussions held fruits in the sense that on 
August 5, 2008, Katanga announced the signing of a memorandum of understanding 
("MoU") with Gécamines that was the basis for: (i) amending the Kamoto Joint Venture 
Agreement to incorporate provisions of the Concession Release Agreement; (ii) merging 
the DCP Joint Venture and Kamoto Joint Venture; and (iii) addressing the requirements 
of the DRC government resulting from the review of mining partnerships with 
Gécamines. The memorandum of understanding targeted seven major areas among them, 
that:  
(i) DCP and KCC were to be merged into a single joint venture company (the 
"Merged JV Company"); 
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(ii) 75 percent of the share capital of the Merged JV Company was to be allocated to 
Katanga's wholly-owned subsidiaries, KFL and GEC or their related entities, and 25 
percent to Gécamines and its subsidiary; consistent with each of the Kamoto Joint 
Venture Agreement and the DCP Joint Venture Agreement;  
(iii) upon implementation of the Amended Kamoto JV Agreement, 5 percent of all 
additional joint venture funding until the project reached 150,000 tonnes of copper output 
per year was to be non-interest bearing and the remaining 95 percent was to bear interest 
at a rate not greater than LIBOR plus 3 percent and; 
(iv) the board of directors of KCC was to be increased to eight members, three of 
whom will be appointed by Gécamines, and KCC will assume day-to-day management of 
the Merged JV Company's operations within 12 months from the date of the MoU. 
From August 12, 2008 the Company has been engaging in a Rehabilitation Project 
Update.168 
3.3 THE COMMISSION REPORT ON MINING CONTRACT REVIEW 
The government of the DRC169 signed the Memorandum for the revision of mining 
contracts on the 20th April 2007 for the review of mining contracts signed between 
private companies and the government or State owned enterprises. It was feared that the 
agreements were a result of corruptions and most people believed that the national riches 
                                                            
168 For example the Kamoto rehabilitation project that was expected to be completed by the end of 2008, providing a 
production capacity of 70,000 tonnes of copper and 3,000 tonnes of cobalt per annum. Under this phase, a third 
cascade mill was being rehabilitated and 58 flotation cells were being added to the circuit in the Kamoto operating 
concentrator (the "Kamoto Concentrator"). At the Luilu hydrometallurgical plant (the "Luilu Metallurgical Plan"), a 
new roaster was being constructed and leaching and electro-winning capacity was to be doubled. Katanga also 
announced the continued development of the KOV Open Pit, construction of a new leach facility, a new processing 
plant and an acid plant  
 
169 Minister of Mines 
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had been exchanged for war spoils and political favours. John Stremlau of the Carter 
Centre was of the view that the mining review offered an opportunity for the Government 
to distinguish itself from the past and to prove its commitment to turn mineral wealth into 
development for the country.170 
The commission had the timeframe of three months to complete the work from the 15th of 
May to the 15th of July 2007.171 It was very important at this time to establish this 
commission and subsequently publish its report because the mining industry was hard hit 
by lack of transparency, the unrealistic time frame and the limited involvement of civil 
society in the work of the inter - ministerial commission. However, the publication of the 
report is far from sufficient to address the deficiencies in the review process. The 
commission finished its work in mid-October 2007 but its report was not released till on 
the 20th day of March 2008 despite a persistent demand of the same from the Congolese 
and international community.172 This report was but a milestone in the whole process of 
restructuring the mining industry in the DRC for the eventual sustainable development of 
the country.173 Individuals, civil societies and international communities,174 were equally 
impressed but insisting that the negotiations process be open.  
The Commission’s summary findings were communicated to the companies concerned 
individually and also through the website of the Ministry of Mines. The companies 
however reacted to this communication in varied ways ranging from downplaying the 
                                                            
170 Hakes D ‘The Mining Review in the DRC: Missed Opportunities, Failed Expectations, Hopes for the Future’. 
(April 3, 2009). 
171 The Commission did not finish its work up to mid-October 2007 
172 The withholding of the report for almost six months rose great suspicions from the public 
173  Available at www.freewebs.com/contratsminiers accessed on 21/12/2011. 
174 Especially the Belgian government 
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scope of the proposed changes to their contract and emphasizing their belief in its 
juridical validity to hinting at the possibility of international arbitration.175 
The Commission’s assignment however, did not solve all of the contemplated problems 
in the mining industry. Unfortunately, this does not appear to have happened.  Although 
the full results have not been disclosed, the known outcomes confirm the most skeptical 
opinions.176This is confirmed by the fact that following the release of this report, the 
DRC Government announced that it would set up a task force comprising of the Chief of 
Staff of the President of the Republic and 8 senior ministers that would guide the next 
phases of the review process. According to Claude Kabemba, the Commission comprised 
of 28 members to wit: The Principal Private Secretary; 2 advisors from the ministry of 
mines ; 2 delegates representatives from the Presidency ; 2 delegates from the prime 
Minister’s office ; 2 delegates from Ministry Finance ; 2 delegates from Ministry in 
Charge of the Budget; 2 delegates  from Ministry Justice ; 2 delegates from Ministry 
without Portfolio ; 2 delegates from Ministry in charge of Industry; 4 delegates from 
General Secretary of Mines ; 4 delegates from Cadastre Minier and 4 delegates from 
technical institutions (CTCPM).177 Acting on the report of the Commission, DRC 
terminated some of the agreements putting forward some of the reasons like non-payment 
of royalties.178 
                                                            
175 This is a position that was taken by First Quantum Minerals Company 
176 Hakes Deborah The Mining Review in the DRC.  
177 Kabemba Claude. ‘Is a Genuine and Transparent Process of Mining Contracts Renegotiation Possible in the 
DRC?’ available at http://archive.revenuewatch.org/dakar/RWI_Dakar_KABEMBA_DRC.doc accessed 29/12/2011. 
 
178 For example At the beginning of August, the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
announced that it terminated its copper and cobalt mining contract with First Quantum for the IFC-backed 
Kingamyambo Musonoi Tailings (KMT) project 
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3.4 IMPACTS OF THE CONTRACTS REVIEW ON MINING 
The review of the mining contracts that came not as an accident in the DRC was 
indispensable for the appraisal of contracts and the reform of the mining sector as 
essential to the consolidation of democracy in the DRC.179 Mining has been the backbone 
for a historical period now. Due to its vast deposits of minerals DRC is popularly called a 
“geological scandal”, possessing valuable mineral reserves of copper, cobalt, gold, 
diamonds, coltan, coal, petroleum, and other commodities. In 2007, approximately US$ 2 
billion was being generated by exploitation of minerals on an industrial, quasi-industrial 
and artisanal scale (ASM). Despite this precious netting, very few Congolese benefited. 
However, the wealth has attracted foreign looters.180 
 
Out of the Commission’s report, the following were realized: Corruption and Spoils of 
the war, Governance of the Mining Sector and Opaque mining contracts. On the face of 
records, it is obvious that if the legal and regulatory framework is relatively 
straightforward there are huge gaps in the government’s capacity to administer the 
mining sector. It was also in the vi8ssion of the Commission that as in many other 
countries, the extractive industries are uniquely susceptible to corruption and non-
transparent practices.181 Finally it was revealed that during the years of war and 
transition, numerous mining contracts that are extremely unfavourable for the DRC were 
                                                            
179 The Carter Center Review of DRC Mining Contracts - Update and Recommendations November 30, 2007.  1 
180 Jean-LucMukeminalumbu. DRC   Mining Contracts Review: a New Chance of Growth. 1 
181 Transparency International ranks DRC as one of the world's most corrupt countries 
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signed.182 All of the above have great impact on the mineral exploitation and the whole 
economy of DRC in general. 
The review report is reported to have impacted the mining sector although in its 
accomplishment of its work it is alleged that: (i) There was no valuation of the assets 
prior to the contract (ii) There was a lot of unexplained variation in the contractual terms 
(iii) There was lack of mechanism by which to enforce the company’s work 
commitments (iv) The failure to provide protections for the parastatal as a minority 
shareholder and (v) Absence of critical information.183  
However, the review report has incited the international community to invest a significant 
sum of money to support stable and accountable institutions in the DRC. For the 
protection of their investments, a number of donors pressed for the rule of law and 
measures to combat corruption, and have financially supported programs towards these 
ends. Nevertheless, most countries have remained aloof from the mining contract review, 
refusing to take a public position on the need for review or to support aspects of the 
process.184 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
182 Those contracts concern the vital mining resources in the country and entail obligations for the coming decades 
183 The Carter Center 4-5 
184 The Carter Center 6 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ANALYSIS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
4.1 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE TANZANIAN AND DRC MINING 
CONTRACTS REVIEWS  
 
Tanzania like the DRC, is endowed with a substantial amount of minerals although the 
mineral contents of the two countries may not be matched. According to the United 
Nations Organisation, the two countries are a fraction of the African continent which is 
well endowed with mineral resources. It harbours the world’s largest mineral reserves of 
platinum, gold, diamonds, chromite, manganese, and vanadium. Yet these statistics are 
probably underestimated due to limited geological mapping of the continent. In addition, 
the continent produces about 17 per cent of the world’s uranium. Most of these minerals 
are exported as ores, concentrates or metals without significant downstream processing to 
add value.185  
According to Claude Kabemba, the DRC holds roughly one-third of the world’s cobalt 
reserves and 10 percent of its copper reserves.186 The two countries are experiencing the 
same problem to wit the dominant economic dogma post-World War II that pushed for an 
open trade policy climate in Africa promising that countries endowed with natural 
resources would experience economic growth by exporting their raw resources as their 
comparative advantage.187 While Tanzania has enjoyed her independence with full 
opportunities to reveal to the world how best she may use her natural resources for the 
benefit of her citizens without disqualification, DRC on the other hand has experienced a 
                                                            
185 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa Africa Review Report on Mining Executive Summary  P.2 
186 Kabemba C Is a Genuine and Transparent Process of Mining Contracts Renegotiation Possible in the DRC? P. 2  
187 Kabemba C. 4 
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generation of wealth squandering especially following Mobutu’s coming to power with 
the backing of Western powers. Congolese leaders have enjoyed political and economic 
benefits from the illegal and uncontrolled external exploitation of the country’s minerals. 
Politically these leaders have been receiving security of their regimes while economically 
they have been benefiting financially from the selling of the resources.  
Proceeds from such illicit business are used to buy the opposition and civil society. 
According to the “All Party Parliamentary Group Report on the Great Lakes of 
November 2002” as quoted by Claude Kabemba, while members of the ruling elite were 
the main beneficiaries of the economic anarchy, others (including foreign business 
people) sought opportunities to take advantage of a system of corruption and the lack of 
governance.188 
However, in the two countries like in some other African countries, there has been 
improved stability in the political and economic environment. This has led to increased 
investment in their minerals sectors while very limited or no investment in the minerals 
linkage sectors. There is also an emergent realization that mining could be a key 
instrument in establishing infrastructure (transport, energy and water) for the 
development of other sectors, such as agriculture and forestry.189  
From what has been discussed in paragraphs two and three, the contracts in the two 
countries between governments and mining companies are often performed in secrecy, 
with confidentiality clauses. In most of the cases, the citizens are precluded from 
knowing exactly what is the government harvesting from these minerals when in fact 
                                                            
188 Kabemba C. 4-5 
189 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa  
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these citizens are the real owners of mineral wealth. According to the United Nations’ 
report, this stems from inadequate democratic governance structures and institutional 
capacities in the area of revenue management.  
Another big problem related to the minerals sector that is common to the two countries is 
that despite the increased participation of civil society organizations and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), their involvement cannot engage government in 
revenue accounting matters. That means there is less transparency and accountability.190 
With the current trend in the world, it is also evidenced that in the two countries there has 
been an increase in multi-stakeholder involvement in the development of mineral policy 
and legislation.  
African participation in ownership of mineral assets has increased (usually as part of the 
so-called Black Economic Empowerment (BEE)), as has gender awareness and female 
involvement in mining and mine ownership.191 In the past, mineral exploitation in the two 
countries was under the state owned cum controlled corporations.192 Following the 
1980’s-1990’s economic reforms the two countries followed suit by conceding to private 
mining investment. It may not be said with certainties that this shift has been of any 
benefit to the two countries and their citizens. This is because governments are forced to 
make major concessions to attract mining capital into their economies due to strong 
global competition for such capital.193 
                                                            
190 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. 5 
191 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. 
192 In Tanzania the mining was being pursued through the public body known as State Mining Corporation 
(STAMICO) while in DRC it was Gécamines 
193 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. 6 
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Because of the lack of seriousness and patriotism, taxation of the minerals industry 
remains an issue between governments and mining companies due to the perceived 
conflict between what constitutes just compensation for the risks mining companies take 
and equitable resource rents accruing to the owners of mineral wealth, there is a trend, 
though it lacks unanimity, towards sharing tax revenues between central, regional and 
local governments with local communities receiving a proportion of mining taxes.194 
For the purpose of making more people benefit from the minerals, the two countries have 
consented to the establishment of Artisanal and Small-scale Mining (ASM) that is a 
labour-intensive sector presenting a greater opportunity for job creation especially in 
rural areas. There is the realization that strategies for ASM need to be rooted into broader 
rural development plans and that there is need to provide greater support to address a 
range of shortcomings including technology, marketing, and skill deficiencies. There has 
been growing awareness to address the poor environmental and healthy practice 
characteristic of ASM. It is further recognized that ASM has negative impacts associated 
with child labour and the impoverishment of miners.195 
4.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 
Despite the fact that most African mining countries have rewritten their mining codes in 
the last 20 years to reflect a shift from government as an owner/operator to 
regulator/administrator, with the private sector assuming the lead in mineral development 
projects, still such reviews are not doing any good apart from benefiting the ruling 
privileged cliques.  Countries which have gone this route include the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ghana, Guinea, Namibia, Nigeria, the United Republic of 
                                                            
194 Chambi Chachage ‘Mwalimu in our popular imagination-the relevance of Nyerere Today’ 
195 Chambi Chachage ‘Mwalimu in our popular imagination-the relevance of Nyerere Today’ 
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Tanzania and Zambia. It is true that the new codes have been objectively aiming at 
attracting FDIs, driven by the need to privatize mining projects and have not necessarily 
been development-oriented. Public participation in drawing these codes is very small. It 
is therefore strongly recommended that there must be greater participation in drawing 
both the contracts and the involved codes. At least all States which are not faring well in 
the mining sector should be advised to turn south of the continent and learn what the 
three extreme southern countries have achieved. In Malawi, Namibia and South Africa 
the new codes have involved extensive consultation. This is worth copying.  
4.3 CONCLUSION 
There is undisputable great need for the mineral producing countries in Africa to review 
mining contracts and publish their results to demonstrate transparency and to enable 
members of the public to submit comments. This might be a very difficult step to take 
since governments have been unwilling to do so, citing a number of excuses, ranging 
from the financial requirements involved in producing copies to be distributed to the 
stakeholders, to the need to respect unspecified confidentiality clauses. Most 
governments capitalize on this issue of confidentiality advanced at various stages as 
justification for not publishing the contracts. It cannot be disputed also that in other 
countries, the governments and companies have tended to use confidentiality as an 
excuse for resisting publication of contracts, payments and other information, thereby 
hindering efforts to increase transparency (both Tanzania and the DRC cannot be 
excluded from this fact). 
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There is a clear contradiction between this position and the official commitment of 
countries to principles of transparency.196 For this reason and if at all the African 
governments want  to benefit their people from these resources , there is no any shortcut 
way/means apart from openly reviewing the confidentiality clauses that are practically 
enshrined in every mineral contract.197 
 
 
                                                            
196 For example like the ones enshrined in EITI for DRC and the Mining Policy in Tanzania 
197 The Congolese Mining Sector in The Balance: Lack of transparency risks undermining review of mining 
contracts A Global Witness Briefing. (1 October 2007). P.8 
 
 
 
 
 93 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Books 
Abiodun AMJ &  Olonisakin, Funmi Peacekeepers, Politicians, and Warlords: The Liberian 
Peace Process (1999). New York: United Nations University Press 
Campbell B & Campbell KB Mining in Africa: regulation and development  (2009) 
London:  Pluto Press 
 
Kabemba C Is a Genuine and Transparent Process of Mining Contracts Renegotiation Possible 
in the DRC? (2008) Revenue Watch Institute 
 
Kriesberg L Constructive conflicts: from escalation to settlement (1998) New York: Rowman 
and Littlefield 
 
Lemarchand R  “The Crisis in the Great Lakes”. In John Haberson & Donald Rothchild (eds.), 
Africa in World Politics 3 ed. (2000).Boulder: Westview Press. 
 
Peleman J “Mining for Serious Trouble: Jean-Raymond Roulle and his Corporate Empire 
Project,” in Abdel-Fatau Musah and J. ‘Kayode Fayemi, (eds) Mercenaries: An African Security 
Dilemma (2000) London: Pluto Press,  
Articles 
Chachage, Chambi (2009)  ‘Mwalimu in our popular imagination-the relevance of Nyerere 
Today’, available at http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/59510 
De Kock, Petrus  ‘The DRC at 50: Confronting the challenges of peace and territorial 
consolidation’ Governance of Africa’s resources programme (2010), South African Institute of 
international Affairs (SAIIA). 
D’Souza, Kevin PCJ ‘Artisanal Mining in the DRC (Key Issues, Challenges and Opportunities) 
(2007) WARDELL ARMSTRONG LLP (a collaborative effort between the World Bank’s 
OGMC Group, DFID's Policy Division, Sustainable Development Group, DFID's DRC office, 
and the World Bank hosted Communities and Small scale Mining (CASM) initiative)  
Francis, David J ‘Diamonds and the Civil War in Sierra Leone’ (2001)  The Courier No.187, 
July-Aug 2001, pp.73-75 
Hakes, Deborah ‘The Mining Review in the DRC: Missed Opportunities, Failed Expectations, 
Hopes for the Future.April 3, 2009’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 94 
 
MacGaffey, J (1991)  ‘The Real Economy of Zaire: The Contribution of Smuggling 
and other Unofficial Activities to National Wealth’. London: James Currey. 
Mbendi Information for Africa. (2004 ‘Democratic Republic of the Congo-Mining: Copper and 
cobalt mining’. Available at www.mbendi.co.za/indy/ming/nkcb/af/zr/p0005.htm  November 17. 
 
Mukeminalumbu Par Jean – Luc, ‘DR Congo mining contract Review; A new chance of growth 
02/04/2007. 
Olan’g Silas (2010) ‘Tanzania Passes a New Mining Law and Builds Capacity for Informed 
Policy Debate’ May 21, 2010. Available at www.revenuewatch.org, (accessed on 14 October 
2010) 
Reports 
Bomani Commission Report. Swahili version available at http://swahili.policyforum-
tz.org/files/ripotiyabomani.pdf (accessed on 9 august 2010). 
Curtis M & Lissu T  A Golden Opportunity?: How Tanzania is Failing to Benefit to from Gold 
Mining, Christian Council of Tanzania (CCT), National Council of Muslims in Tanzania 
(BAKWATA) and Tanzania Episcopal Conference (TEC) (March 2008) Dar es Salaam, 
Tanzania 
Democratic Republic of Congo Mining Report 
Des Forges  A. Human Rights Watch – World Report 2001: DRC. New York, April 
 
Global Witness Digging in corruption: Fraud, abuse and exploitation in Katanga’s copper and 
cobalt (July 2006) 
 
Goldstuck, Alison (2010)‘Securing a social licence to operate? From stone age to New age 
mining in Tanzania’ Governance of Africa’s Resources Programme, South African Institute of 
international Affairs, Research Report 
Greenock Resources INC Update Report (January 11, 2011)  
Katunga  J “Report from Africa. Population, Health, Environment, and Conflict: Minerals, 
Forests, and Violent Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo”. ECSP Report. Issue 12 
(2006-2007)  
Lambrechts K (editor) “Breaking the Curse: How Transparent Taxation and Fair Taxes can Turn 
Africa’s Mineral Wealth into Development” (2009)  Open Society Institute of Southern Africa, 
Johannesburg Third World Network Africa, Accra Tax Justice Network Africa, Nairobi Action 
Aid International, Johannesburg Christian Aid, London, (report). 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/25_03_09_breaking_the_curse.pdf (accessed on 18th 
august 2010). 
 
 
 
 
 
 95 
 
Mhinda AM  ‘CSO perspective Mining Reforms in Tanzania: Concerns and opportunities for 
engagement Tanzanian’ Tanzania Mineworkers Development Organisation Arusha, CCIC Policy 
Seminar May 13, 2009, available at www.ccic.ca/_.../002_trade_2009-
05_mhinda_presentation.pdf, (accessed on 5th September 2010). 
Mineral Policy (Tanzania) available at www.tzonline.org (accessed on 10 October 2010) 
Mineral Sector overview in Tanzania available at www.mem.go.tz,(accessed on 20th September 
2010) 
Mines. Washington, DC: Global Witness. Available online at http://www.globalpolicy.org/ 
 
Mukeminalumbu J (MBM-Conseil). (2007)” D.R Congo Mining Contracts Review: A New 
Chance of Growth Kinshasa”, 2 April 2007 
NDF mining, Final draft report Tanzania available at www.ndf.fi/docs/NDF-mining-Final-draft-
report-Tanzania.pdf, accessed on October 2010-10-16. 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) & African Development 
Bank (ABD). (2006, May). “Democratic Republic of Congo.” In African environmental outlook, 
2005-2006 (pp. 215-227). OECD & ABD. Available online at  
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/13/8/36746740.pdf 
 
Report on Minerals Royalty forms and Rates Applicable in the Mining Industry, available at 
www.mem.go.tz, (accessed on 10th October 2010) 
 
The Carter Center Review of DRC Mining Contracts - Update and Recommendations November 
30, 2007 
The Congolese Mining Sector in The Balance: Lack of transparency risks undermining review of 
mining contracts (1 October 2007) A Global Witness Briefing. 
The United Republic of Tanzania President’s Office Planning Commission The National 
Investment Promotion Policy October 1996 
The United Republic of Tanzania Vice President’s Office The national Environment Policy. 
Dar-es-Salaam, December  
The World Bank “Democratic Republic of Congo Growth with Governance in the Mining 
Sector”  Document  Report No. 43402-ZR (May 2008) 
UN Security Council 2001a “Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of 
Natural Resources and” United Nations Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation 
of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
October 2002 www.smartsanctions.se/stockholm.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 96 
 
 
Discussion Papers 
 
Andersson J & Slunge D “Tanzania – Environmental Policy Brief”  Sida-funded Helpdesk for 
Strategic Environmental Assessment at the Environmental Economics Unit (2005), Göteborg 
University and Maria Berlekom at SwedBio 
 
Campbell, Bonnie (ed) ‘Regulating Mining in Africa: For Whose benefit?’ Discussion Paper 26 
(2004) available at www.nai.uu.se/electronic publications 
 
De Kock P The DRC at 50: Confronting the challenges of peace and territorial consolidation’ 
Governance of Africa’s Resources Programme (2010)   South African Institute of international 
Affairs 
George K “Potential Impacts of FDI on Economic Development in Tanzania”, A paper prepared 
for a Policy Dialogue for Accelerating Growth and Poverty Reduction in Tanzania, held at the 
Conference Hall, ESRF, on May 25th, 2006 Available at www.tanzaniagateway.org   (accessed 
on 18 September 2010) 
Goldstuck A “Securing a social Licence to operate?, From stone age to New age mining in 
Tanzania” Research report 7,Governance of Africa’s resources programme, South African 
Institute of international Affairs (SAIIA),Feb 2010 
Ross M “How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from 13 Cases” Department 
of Political Science, UCLA, June 11, 2003 
 
Websites 
www.Africa-Confidential.com 
http://allafrica.com/stories 
http://www.cbfp.org/en/THE_FORESTS_OF_THE_CONGO_BASIN_State_of_the_Forest_2006.
pdf 
 
www.ccic.ca/_.../002_trade_2009-05_mhinda_presentation.pdf 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barrick_Gold 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobutu_Sese_Seko. 
 eResearch Corporation www.eresearch.ca 
www.freewebs.com/contratsminiers 
www.globalwitness.org 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/congo/2006/07digging.pdf 
 
 
 
 
 
 97 
 
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2006/10/26/business/AF_FEA_FIN_Tanzania_Mining.php 
http://www.jamiiforums.com/jukwaa-la-siasa/13353-bomani-committee-hiding-the-truth-2.html 
http://www.katangamining.com/kat/investor_relations/annual-info-forms/aif-2011/aif-2011.pdf 
 
www.lexadin.nl/wlg/legis/nofr/oeur/lxwetan. 
http://www.mbendi.co.za/indy/ming/nkcb/af/zr/p0005.htm 
 
http://www.mbm 
http://www.mbm avocats.cd 
www.mem.go.tz 
http://www.miningcongo.cd/codeminier/codeminier_eng.pdf 
www.nai.uu.se/electronic 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/25_03_09_breaking_the_curse.pdf 
www.ndf.fi/docs/NDF-mining-Final-draft-report-Tanzania.pdf 
www.parliament.go.tz/ 
www.parliament.go.tz/POLIS/PAMS/Docs/HS-19-9-2010.pdf, 
www.revenuewatch.org 
http://swahili.policyforum-tz.org/files/ripotiyabomani.pdf 
www.smartsanctions.se/stockholm. 
www.tanrange.com, 
www.tanzaniagateway.org/docs 
http://www.tanzaniageteway.org/news/news/article.asp?ID=57 
www.tzonline.org 
 
 
 
 
 
